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ABSTRACT 
 




 This thesis introduces the concept of “eccentric spectatorship” in order to explore 
the ways in which Showtime’s The L Word – a fictional program about lesbian women – 
may address heterosexual spectators, and how the specificity of one’s spectatorial 
position can exceed this address at the level of identification and desire. Using Teresa de 
Lauretis’ formative theory of the “eccentric subject,” this thesis will discuss how the 
effects of one’s excessive spectatorial position may extend beyond the immediate viewing 
process; the occupation of an excessive spectatorial position is a transformative subjective 
experience, altering the ways in which spectators make sense of themselves and interact 
with their social and material reality. To make this argument, this thesis will include a 
brief case study of The L Word in order to explore how the camera work, narrative, and 
visual images offer heterosexual spectators specific positionalities of identification and 
desire. This thesis will conclude that an eccentric viewing position not only accounts for 
spectators’ multiple interpretative possibilities, but also acknowledges differences 
between (and even within) spectators; representations engage viewers differently based 
on the social, cultural, and subjective (conscious and unconscious) positions within which 
they are situated. As a result, spectatorial identifications are revealed to be as equally 
unstable as identity itself. 
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  1 
Televisual Spectatorship: Between Agency and the Unconscious 
 
 It has been four years since its series finale, and academics and fans alike are still 
talking about The L Word – a fictional television program following the lives of a group 
of lesbian friends living in Los Angeles. The Showtime series began its six-season run in 
January 2004, and has acquired a broad-based viewership. The L Word remains an 
influential piece of television programming for both popular and queer culture, as it was 
the first and only show in television history to include lesbian characters as part of the 
series’ primary narrative. 
The L Word’s marketability to a populous viewing audience1 has been met with 
polarizing opinions from fans and scholars within the academy and without2. However, 
much of the attention paid to the show continues to be centered on how the figure of the 
lesbian is represented. On the one hand, The L Word has been celebrated for its 
representational diversity, offering audiences “positive” portrayals of lesbian characters. 
On the other hand, the show has been simultaneously condemned as a means by which 
                                                
1 The two-hour series premiere of episodes one and two of The L Word was watched by 
approximately 936,000 viewers (http://www.tv.com/shows/the-l-word/pilot-279730/), 
while the series’ finale was the third most-watched episode, drawing 756,000 viewers 
(http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/189728_L_Word_Series_Finale_Delivers_For
_Showtime.php). Although the viewer ratings for the duration of the series was lower 
than either the pilot or the series finale, the ratings “spike” for the final episode ostensibly 
indicates that viewers had been watching all along, albeit not necessarily during the live 
premiere of each episode. 
 
2 The academic attention The L Word has received indicates that the series is culturally 
relevant, warranting further analysis. As a result, I have grouped these two categories of 
viewers together in order to acknowledge the possibility that fans and academics are not 
mutually exclusive. This grouping is an indication of my own political commitment to 
not only maintain the study of popular culture as culturally significant, but also challenge 
the power differentials between academic researcher and fans by suggesting that it is 
possible for academics to be fans of The L Word. It was certainly my own adoration of 
the series that drove me to conduct research on The L Word. 
 
  2 
the television industry has “cashed-in” on the burgeoning lesbian market. For some, then, 
the increased visibility of lesbian characters on The L Word does not necessarily translate 
into representational diversity; stereotypical portrayals of “the lesbian” continue to 
permeate televisual discourse. 
Whether the L Word is championed or condemned for its representational content, 
the argument that television programs fail to represent a diversity of lesbianisms is hardly 
new, or frankly, very interesting. The crude distinction that there are, in fact, qualitatively 
“good” and “bad” ways to represent the figure of the lesbian unintentionally imagines 
these normative categories as absolute: that there are widely accepted “good” and “bad” 
representations. Such theoretical dualisms are predicated on the assumption that the 
figure of the lesbian is intrinsically meaningful to spectators; there is no consideration of 
the extent to which differences in spectatorial positioning may affect what “good” and 
“bad” representations do for certain spectators. While it is not my intention to undercut 
the political importance of lesbian visibility, such binarized discussions of 
representational diversity as a matter of who is and is not represented potentially reaffirm 
normative grounds for recognition; that is to say, it is precisely because lesbian characters 
are represented within the confines of hegemonic femininity that they are in fact too 
normative, and are therefore not disruptive enough of normative gender categories. As 
such, this mode of theorizing does not necessarily account for the figure of the lesbian as 
an object of fantasy or desire for spectators. Rather, the figure of the lesbian is largely 
discussed as an object of identification, emphasizing the spectator’s search for an 
“accurate” representation of herself; if the spectator does not see herself represented 
  3 
accurately, she is thus foreclosed from the normative representations of the figure of the 
lesbian on screen. 
This project will attempt to displace the opposition between “positive” and 
“negative” representations by reintroducing the spectatorial subject as the primary object 
of inquiry. To accomplish this task, I wish to suspend normative judgments about lesbian 
representations, especially in relation to the “accuracy” of the representations on The L 
Word. This suspension will provide me with the opportunity to address the ways in which 
The L Word appeals to different audiences, and what the effects of this appeal are for 
spectators. What is important for my research, then, is to discuss what possibilities for 
identification The L Word offers spectators, and how spectators make their identifications 
meaningful. While I am certainly not the first individual who has made it my aim to 
explore how spectators engage in processes of identification (as mentioned previously, 
The L Word has garnered much academic attention, with numerous books and articles 
published on this topic), this task becomes even more complicated when an analysis of 
how The L Word may address female heterosexual spectators is considered the object of 
this study. It is necessary then for me to begin with a discussion of how spectatorial 
identifications are currently considered in relation to The L Word. In doing so, I will be 
able to explore how the current literature convinces of the ways in which The L Word 
addresses female heterosexual viewers as spectatorial subjects, offering them specific 
possibilities for identification and desire. 
Much of the literature examining the possibilities for identification The L Word 
offers spectators is couched in the language of “learning.” For many television scholars, 
the televisual medium is considered a form of “travel”; the episodic nature of regularly 
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scheduled programming encourages spectators to “tune in” once a week, “[introducing] 
us to people we might otherwise never meet, and [introducing] us to lives and ideas 
foreign to us” (Gray 55). As Kristen Crites argues in her article “The L Word,” “we learn 
what alternative family structures look like, how they function, and how normal they 
really are… there are people just like us within this world” (125). While Crites does not 
explicitly use the term identification in her article, her argument touts the supposed 
“relatability” of homosexual interpersonal relationships by appealing to a humanist 
discourse; spectators may not share the same sexual orientation as the lesbian characters 
depicted on The L Word, but they are able to relate to the ways in which these fictional 
characters structure their relationships with one another (124). For Crites, then, The L 
Word offers spectators a glimpse into the lives of lesbian women – a sight with which 
they may be initially unfamiliar. 
Paula Graham makes an argument similar to Crites in her article “The L Word 
Under-Whelms the UK?” emphasizing the universality of emotional experiences. 
According to Graham the emotional dilemmas facing The L Word characters are 
experiences with which all spectators, regardless of sexual orientation, can identify (19). 
Graham’s argument departs from Crites as she specifically addresses how heterosexual 
spectators come to identify with and experience lesbian emotional dilemmas. As Graham 
argues “straight women can also participate in lesbian dilemmas more immediately 
though identification with straight character Kit Porter’s perspective” (19). 
While Graham offers a compelling analysis, her use of the term identification 
lacks conceptual clarity: it is unclear what, exactly, spectators are identifying with in Kit. 
Since Kit is one of the few straight characters on The L Word, I can only speculate that 
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Graham considers her to be an ideal proxy because Kit, like the heterosexual spectator, is 
a straight woman; that is to say, for Graham, gender is bound to sexuality, excluding 
female heterosexual spectators from the possibility of identifying with and desiring the 
lesbian characters (de Lauretis, Technologies of Gender 2). What is at issue for me, then, 
is the extent to which Kit’s sexual orientation is assumed to be the primary vector 
through which straight spectators ought to identify. As a result, Graham’s theory of 
spectatorial identification is limited to the spectator’s search for herself on screen; 
spectators identify with Kit because she narrowly approximates the straight viewer’s own 
gendered and sexual identity. 
While it may not have been within the scope of Graham’s article to introduce an 
analysis of how Kit’s race structures spectatorial identification, this omission forecloses 
any discussion as to how Kit’s racialized identity as a voluptuous black woman (amongst 
a cast full of thin, white characters) may structure the possibilities for identification 
offered to spectators differently. As Teresa de Lauretis notes, “the female subject is en-
gendered, constructed and defined in gender across multiple representations of class, 
race, language, and social relations; and that, therefore, differences among women are 
differences within women” (Technologies of Gender 139). In other words, it is because 
each female spectatorial subject is engendered across multiple social relations that she is 
subjectively engaged by representations differently; not all spectators will identify with 
the character of Kit in the same way. Thus, one vector or social identity (be it race, 
gender, class, or sexuality) cannot provide the foundation for a complex theory of 
spectatorial identification (de Lauretis citing Lorde, Figures of Resistance 59). By failing 
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to account for this difference both between and within spectatorial subjects, Graham 
unintentionally massifies spectators into an undifferentiated viewing audience.  
Several scholars have attempted to overcome this limitation in the literature by 
acknowledging the possibility for spectators to identify with lesbian characters. In the 
article “Understand the Queer World of the L-esbian Body: Using Queer as Folk and The 
L Word to Address the Construction of the Lesbian Body” Daniel Farr and Nathalie 
Degroult (citing Ciasullo) argue that only a certain “type” of woman embodies “the 
lesbian” identity on The L Word: thin, white, middle-class, feminine, and able-bodied 
(426). More specifically, the characters’ costumes and props serve to de-lesbianize the 
figure of the lesbian; high heels are a staple in most of The L Word characters’ stylish 
wardrobes, and almost all of the women are depicted with perfectly coiffed hair and a full 
face of make-up (Farr and Degroult 424). This “lipstick” lesbian stereotype renders the 
masculine “butch” lesbian invisible, constructing the figure of the lesbian as “not a 
lesbian, but a woman first and foremost” (Farr and Degroult 436). 
While Farr and Degroult do not explicitly deploy the term identification, their 
argument suggests that the creation of a “consumable lesbian” is a way for lesbian 
characters to become more “palatable” to spectators. More specifically, the spectator is 
able to visually “consume” the figure of the lesbian because she, like this figure, is first 
and foremost a woman. Although the spectator and lesbian character may not share the 
same desire for other women, this figure narrowly approximates the spectator’s gendered 
identity. 
Michele Aaron makes an argument similar to Farr and Degroult’s in her article 
“New Queer Cable?: The L Word, the Small Screen and the Bigger Picture.” According 
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to Aaron, The L Word’s hegemonically feminine characters invite spectators to identify 
with the figure of the lesbian because this figure narrowly approximates the spectator’s 
own gendered identity. Building on Farr and Degroult’s assertion, however, Aaron 
suggests that this possibility for identification provides spectators with an opportunity to 
experience “empathy as well as voyeurism” (35).  
Although Aaron’s as well as Farr and Degroult’s theory of the “consumable” 
lesbian may depart from Graham’s analysis by offering an explanation as to how 
spectators can, in fact, identify with the figure of the lesbian, each theorist’s 
preoccupation with gender identity forecloses the very object that makes The L Word 
different from other shows centering on a cast of women: that is, lesbian sexuality. This 
focus on gendered identity in academic discourse does not account for the possibility for 
spectators to experience same-sex desires when watching The L Word; it is assumed that 
the spectator cannot engage in same-sex desires precisely because she would experience 
an internal contradiction that challenges her identity as a normative heterosexual subject 
external to the viewing process. 
What contributes to this elision is the extent to which the visual image – rather 
than the spectatorial subject – is given primacy in televisual analyses of The L Word. (As 
mentioned previously, much of the academic literature on The L Word is characterized by 
binary debates between “realistic” and “non-realistic” lesbian representations). As in the 
cases of Aaron, and Farr and Degroult, analyses of televisual spectatorial identification 
are limited to a discussion of how gendered identity is visually articulated. Many of 
Aaron’s as well as Farr and Degroult’s examples explore how the figure of the lesbian is 
represented within the confines of hegemonic femininity, unintentionally conflating a 
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character’s gender identity with her sexuality. As a result, there is no discussion of the 
ways in which the other formal devices such as the camera work and narrative (in 
addition to the visual images) encourage spectatorial identifications. 
Since this emphasis on the visual articulation of gender cannot account for the 
possibility that heterosexual spectators may experience same-sex desire (or any other 
form of queer desire, for that matter), processes of identification can only be defined in 
literal terms as the spectator’s search for herself on screen; the spectator is only able to 
identify with a character who narrowly approximates her own gendered or sexual identity 
(Mayne 26). In Aaron’s analysis specifically, spectators may only adopt an empathetic 
and distant, voyeuristic viewing position since they cannot identify with a lesbian 
character’s desire for other women. What is at issue for me is the extent to which Aaron’s 
as well as Farr and Degroult’s analyses presume that The L Word only addresses a 
particular “type” of heterosexual spectator. This spectator is incapable of viewing The L 
Word with anything but voyeuristic curiosity because it is assumed that The L Word can 
only address her as a normative sexual subject: one who has been inscribed in the current 
heteronormative structure of identification and desire. For Aaron, and Farr and Degroult, 
spectatorial identifications require a stable and essential notion of identity (Mayne 27; 
Minh-ha 215); it is a complete and totalizing process whereby a viewer either engages in 
processes of identification, or not at all, thus occupying the position of a distanced 
voyeur.  
Aaron’s as well as Farr and Degroult’s analyses not only foreclose any discussion 
of how The L Word addresses viewers differently based on the social, cultural, and 
subjective positions within which they are situated, but also undermine the very identity 
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politics that support The L Word: that seeing positive representations of lesbian characters 
may have transformative effects on cultural norms. Surely, this cannot be the viewing 
position through which heterosexual women watch The L Word. Without the possibility 
for heterosexual spectators to engage in processes of identification that exceed the search 
for oneself on screen by experiencing same-sex desire, viewing The L Word would be 
disappointing and unsatisfying: in a word, dull. As a result, such theories cannot explain 
what, exactly, drives heterosexual women to watch The L Word; that is, a show about 
lesbian sexuality. 
Although much of the literature discussing spectatorial identification excludes the 
possibility for spectators to desire lesbian characters, there have been several attempts to 
develop a more nuanced theory of identification inclusive of spectatorial desire. In the 
article “Becoming the Homovoyeur: Consuming Homosexual Representations in Queer 
as Folk” Sheri Manuel specifically addresses how spectators identify with and desire 
homosexual characters. (While Manuel’s essay provides a detailed case study of 
Showtime’s Queer as Folk – a fictional television program about a group of homosexual 
men – she asserts that her analysis can be applied to other programs, such as The L 
Word.) According to Manuel, spectators are invited to adopt the position of the 
“homovoyeur” whereby the spectator “may identify along intersecting lines of sexual 
orientation, gender, social constraints/privileges, or class… [or] may escape into a fantasy 
role, imagining themselves as the [gay or lesbian character] to who they have no 
identification whatsoever” (281). 
Unlike much of the literature I addressed previously, Manuel’s concept of 
“homovoyeurism” offers a theory to explain how spectators may come to experience 
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same-sex desire. For Manuel, spectators are offered a multitude of viewing positions 
from which they can choose to view The L Word. As such, spectators may imagine a 
lesbian character’s desire for other women as their own by adopting a fantasmic viewing 
position. 
Despite this affordance, however, Manuel’s concept of homovoyeurism is 
predicated on the assumption that spectatorship is a largely conscious process; the 
homovoyeur is able to appropriate cultural texts for her own individual purposes. Manuel 
overemphasizes the supremacy of the spectator’s role in processes of identification. The 
spectator possesses the capacity to privilege one vector or social identity (i.e., race, 
gender, class, sexuality) over another in order to identify with any character that 
approximates the viewer’s own identity (Heller 64). As a result, Manuel fails to consider 
the extent to which the image is already overdetermined with meaning for the spectator; 
the very possibility (or impossibility) of viewing The L Word is dependent on the 
historical, social, and subjective positions (conscious and unconscious) within which the 
spectator is situated (de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t 149). 
 Candace Moore attempts to provide a more detailed explanation of how spectators 
can experience same-sex desire. In her articles “Having It All Ways: The Tourist, the 
Traveler, and the Local in The L Word” and “Getting Wet: The Heteroflexibility of 
Showtime’s The L Word” Moore suggests that the primary means by which spectators 
view The L Word is through a “tourist’s gaze” (“Having It All Ways” 5). Borrowing this 
concept from Ellen Strain’s notion of the “touristic gaze,” Moore argues that: 
Media technologies share with tourism the fetishization of the experience 
of ‘being there,’ while they simultaneously distance the viewer from the 
  11 
‘viewed.’ Particularly, characteristics of this ‘touristic gaze’ are dual 
positions of immersion  (the viewer in the drama and mise-en-scène) and 
distance (the remove implied by voyeurism). The latter element of the 
touristic gaze exoticizes the ‘other,’ and attempts to obtain totalizing 
knowledges of a people or a place. (“Having It All Ways” 6) 
For Moore, then, spectators are invited to adopt a voyeuristic and “touristic” 
viewing position from which they can safely observe the unfamiliar “L World” at a 
distance. (It must be noted that Moore continues to adopt the language of “learning” and 
“travel” that has characterized televisual analyses of spectatorial identification). 
However, Moore maintains that once the voyeur has adopted a “touristic gaze” they are 
able to engage in fantasy and role-play opportunities through “heteroflexible” 
spectatorship; the spectator no longer views The L Word as a distant and voyeuristic 
“tourist” but adopts the position of a temporary “traveller” within the “L World” 
(“Having It All Ways” 6). Thus, “through heteroflexibility, straight viewers gain access 
to the ‘local’ imaginary, sharing in the queer sensibility” (Moore, “Having It All Ways” 
20).  
Moore suggests that spectators can develop this “insider” understanding of the “L 
Word” through the subjective entry point of Jenny Schecter (played by Mia Kirshner): a 
heterosexual character proxy for the straight spectator (“Having It All Ways” 11). Moore 
maintains that the spectator is introduced to the “L World” through the character of 
Jenny, who is initially, like the heterosexual spectator, a “straight” voyeur. Like most of 
the characters depicted in the show, Jenny is also a hegemonically feminine woman, 
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which makes her more “relatable” to the heterosexual spectator; Jenny approximates the 
straight viewer’s own gendered and sexual identity (Moore, “Getting Wet” 124).  
In addition to this supposed “relatability” of Jenny’s gendered and sexual identity, 
Moore argues that the camera work invites spectators to adopt Jenny’s “look” as their 
own. Citing the infamous pool scene in the pilot episode, Moore recounts the moment at 
which Jenny (along with the spectator) is introduced to the “local” imaginary of the “L 
World.” According to Moore: 
Jenny approaches the bamboo fence bordering the neighbor’s pool to 
glimpse mop-haired Shane (Katherine Moennig) unbuttoning her white 
shirt and throwing it carelessly to the side. Another woman pulls her blue 
floral-print dress over her head. Embarrassed, Jenny ducks, and the 
camera cuts to a shot of empty slats between the bamboo stalks, her 
voyeuristic gaze. The subsequent reverse shot, from Jenny’s point of view, 
sutures the spectator’s gaze to hers and frames the naked women in the 
fence’s vertical structure. (“Having It All Ways” 3) 
As indicated by Moore, this shot-reverse-shot technique “invites new potential 
heterosexual fans to take touristic pleasure in lesbian sex from the ‘straight’ perspective 
to which they are accustomed” (“Having It All Ways” 10). In other words, since Jenny, 
like the heterosexual spectator, is also a “‘straight’ tourist,” the camera work encourages 
spectators to adopt Jenny’s mode of looking as their own (Moore, “Having It All Ways” 
8). For Moore, then, the straight viewer is able to watch this lesbian sex scene safely from 
Jenny’s own distant and voyeuristic viewing position. 
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As the first season unfolds, however, Jenny’s sexuality is revealed to be more 
“flexible”; Jenny struggles with her sexual identity as she is forced to choose between her 
fiancée, Tim, and her new lesbian lover, Marina. For Moore, this “queering” of Jenny’s 
“straight” perspective subsequently “queers” the spectator’s mode of viewing; since 
spectators have gained entry into the “L World” through the character of Jenny, initially 
accepting her eye line as their own, Jenny’s character now offers straight viewers a 
“safely ambiguous place” from which to experiment (“Having It All Ways” 10). In other 
words, heterosexual spectators are presented with the opportunity to adopt Jenny’s desire 
for other women as their own (Moore, “Having It All Ways” 8). Moore maintains that 
this heteroflexible viewing position challenges heteronormative models of deriving 
pleasure from seeing that has characterized televisual analyses of spectatorial 
identification; heteroflexible spectatorship not only recognizes that spectators can, 
indeed, experience same-sex desire, but also reveals “viewers’ identities, if only at the 
level of imagination, [as] a great deal more fluid” (“Having It All Ways” 20). 
Unlike many of the theorists discussed previously, Moore acknowledges the 
potential for spectators to experience same-sex desire through heteroflexibility. It must be 
noted, however, that Moore’s concept of heteroflexibility articulates a specific stage set 
of fantasy. More specifically, Moore argues that Jenny’s voyeuristic and “touristic gaze” 
from behind the fence is the primary means through which the spectator gains entry into 
this unfamiliar “L World.” While this heteroflexibility does offer spectators one viewing 
position within the “L World,” Moore unintentionally confines spectators’ experiences of 
same-sex desire to their interaction with the screen; it is precisely because Moore refers 
to this voyeuristic gaze as “touristic” that limits her ability to address the ways in which 
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spectators’ experiences of same-sex desire may extending beyond the immediate viewing 
process. For Moore, the “tourist” can always return “home.” However, as I will argue, the 
heterosexual spectator may in fact find her original “home” inhospitable after watching 
and enjoying a show about lesbian sexuality, which is to say that the spectator’s 
experiences of same-sex desire may influence how she makes sense of herself outside of 
her engagement with The L Word. 
Although Moore’s theory does not account for the ways in which a heteroflexible 
viewing position may affect the spectator’s own subjectivity, the literature indicates that 
this shortcoming partly stems from the fact that many of The L Word’s lesbian characters 
are played by heterosexual actresses. As Rebecca Beirne (citing Inness) notes, the 
characters’ desire for other women is “titillation without threat as there is an implicit 
understanding that these are not ‘real’ lesbians” (12). In other words, the same-sex 
desires articulated on The L Word are both fictional and performative; the actresses are 
merely playing the role of a lesbian who desires other women (Chung 100). The 
implication for spectators is that they are able to return to a completely “heterosexual” 
state outside of the fiction “L World.” Consequently, this fantasmic mode of viewing 
offered to spectators through heteroflexibility not only presumes spectators’ desires as 
static and unchanging, but also conceptualizes spectatorial identification as a complete 
and totalizing process; a viewer either engages in processes of identification fully, or not 
at all, thus occupying the position of an ultimately unaffected “dreamer.” 
I also question the extent to which spectators are only able to experience same-sex 
desire through the subjective entry point of another “straight” tourist (who is, according 
to Moore, the only appropriate “stand-in” for the heterosexual spectator) (“Having It All 
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Ways” 8). More specifically, Moore’s assertion that Jenny is an ideal proxy by which 
spectators gain entry into the “L World” unravels when a discussion of fans’ reception to 
the character is considered; although Jenny may approximate the spectator’s own 
gendered and sexual identity, she is one of the most despised characters on the show. 
(One needs only to conduct a quick Google search to find numerous blog posts and 
discussion forums expressing contempt for Jenny; she is the “bitch” The L Word fans – 
heterosexual and homosexual – “love to hate”). Is it really so conclusive that Jenny is the 
most appropriate means by which heterosexual spectators gain entry into the “L World”? 
Similarly, Moore’s theory of heteroflexible spectatorship does not provide a 
satisfactory response to spectators’ fascination with Shane McCutcheon (played by 
Katherine Moennig) – The L Word’s fan favourite lesbian. Unlike Jenny, Shane is an 
androgynous, womanizing nymphomaniac; she does not necessarily approximate the 
“straight” viewer’s own gendered and sexual identity. Yet, Shane’s iconic status amongst 
The L Word fans (specifically, heterosexual spectators) has spawned a devout following 
and a plethora of Shane-themed merchandise, including a t-shirt with the pertinent 
slogan: “I’d go Gay for Shane.” This fan phenomenon reveals that spectatorial 
identifications are not solely determined by the ways in which The L Word addresses 
heterosexual spectators; it is possible for spectatorial identifications to exceed the search 
for oneself on screen. 
*** 
The goal of this project is twofold. First, this thesis will explore the ways in which 
The L Word may address heterosexual spectators, and how the specificity of one’s 
spectatorial position can exceed this address at the level of identification and desire. 
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Second, this thesis will discuss how the effects of one’s excessive spectatorial position 
may extend beyond the immediate viewing process. As I will suggest, the occupation of 
an excessive spectatorial position is a transformative subjective experience, altering the 
ways in which spectators make sense of themselves and interact with their social and 
material reality. As a result, this thesis will begin where Moore’s concludes: that 
voyeurism not only provides spectators with a “heteroflexible” viewing position within 
the “L World,” but also has constitutive effects on the spectator’s subjectivity both during 
and after the immediate viewing process (de Lauretis, Practice of Love 125). 
This thesis seeks to emphasize the contradictions in heterosexual identity in order 
to decenter normativity and the very category of heterosexuality. I will attempt to account 
for a feminist subject that is not only attentive to the processual nature of subject 
formation, but also reflexive of difference and contradiction. While reintroducing the 
heterosexual spectatorial subject as my primary object of inquiry is a conscious attempt 
to avoid the trappings of discussing lesbian representations as either “good” or “bad,” the 
challenge of this project will be to define what I mean by spectatorial identification, 
making clear who, exactly, the spectatorial subject is.  
 
Toward a Theory of Televisual Spectatorial Identification 
The term “identification” is a widely used concept deployed in televisual analyses of 
spectatorship. However, as indicated above, this term often lacks conceptual clarity: it is 
unclear with what, exactly, spectators are identifying, and how this process of 
identification takes place. Much of this conceptual imprecision stems from how the 
spectatorial subject is defined. According to Judith Mayne, theories of spectatorship 
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center on complicated negotiations between defining the spectator as either the “viewer” 
or “subject” of a film whereby the “viewer” is “the real person who watches” and the 
“subject” is “the position supposedly assigned to the film viewer by the institutions of the 
cinema” (8). 
Current televisual models for theorizing spectatorship are indebted to Cultural 
Studies contributions on the “active” spectator. More specifically, Cultural Studies 
theorists have attempted to challenge the idea that the spectator is merely a “passive” 
subject positioned by the cinematic apparatus (Mayne 8). With the development of more 
empirically-based audience research and reception studies, televisual models of 
spectatorship emphasize the importance of what spectators are actively doing with a 
cultural text by observing spectators’ responses to viewing a particular program; the 
spectator is a real viewer, rather than a “passive” subject who is assigned a singular 
viewing position by the institutions of the cinema (Mayne 54; 62). As spectatorial agents, 
televisual viewers are able to “read against the grain” and resist being interpellated by 
dominant ideology, appropriating cultural texts for their own individual purposes; there is 
an understanding that viewers are able to engage in processes of identification differently 
based on the specific gendered, racial, class, and sexual positions within which they are 
situated (Chauduri 42-43). 
As Cultural Studies theorists attempted to address what was perceived as an 
emphasis on processes of interpellation and inscription in psychoanalytic film theory, the 
spectator, rather than the cinematic institution, became the primary object of study. 
However, the capacity for spectators to “choose” how they identify with and appropriate 
cultural texts assumes that spectatorial identification is a largely conscious process, 
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overemphasizing the supremacy of spectators’ roles in meaning production (Stacey 38-
39). According to Judith Mayne “the notion of the unconscious seems to have become 
purely instrumental, referring to how individuals unconsciously assume the attributes of 
subjectivity and ideology in a given culture” (61). For Cultural Studies’ theorists, then, 
psychoanalytic theories of spectatorship are merely extensions of early apparatus film 
theory, which conceptualizes the spectator as a monolithic and homogeneous subject. 
Thus, the unconscious is assumed to be synonymous with dominant ideology, erecting a 
misconceived dichotomy between external events as something “real,” and internal, 
unconscious events as “unreal” (de Lauretis citing Rose, Figures of Resistance 161). It is 
this rejection of the unconscious in Cultural Studies accounts of spectatorship that 
unintentionally privileges the “rational” status associated with conscious thought. 
This elision of the unconscious has several implications for exploring the 
complicated ways in which heterosexual spectators watch a show like The L Word. More 
specifically, Cultural Studies theories of spectatorship and ethnographic methodologies 
are unable to account for the relationship between the unconscious and heterosexual 
spectators’ experiences of same-sex desire. The L Word’s appeal (that is, lesbian 
sexuality) may be largely unconscious for spectators who identify as “straight” as this 
contradictory experience of same-sex desire may be repressed or displaced during 
conscious modes of viewing.  
The rejection of the unconscious in current televisual analyses of spectatorship 
cannot account for the complexities of the spectator’s subjectivity at the level of gender 
and sexuality; the spectator’s gendered or sexual identity are not the sole determinants of 
her possibilities for identification and desire. While Moore’s analysis suggests that The L 
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Word provides avenues for heterosexual identification (i.e., through the heterosexual 
proxy of Jenny during the “pool scene”), spectators may also watch in very different 
ways that are unanticipated not only by the modes of address in the show, but also by 
heterosexual spectators themselves. A show like The L Word presumes, at the very least, 
a spectatorial subject that is interested in a show about lesbian women. However, without 
an analysis of spectatorial desire as a psychic and unconscious mechanism, processes of 
identification can only be defined in literal terms as the search for oneself on screen. 
Psychoanalytic theories of spectatorship have much to contribute to the 
development of a more nuanced understanding of televisual spectatorial identifications as 
something other than the search for oneself. In their book The Language of Psycho-
Analysis, Jean Laplanche and J.B. Pontalis define identification as a “[p]sychological 
process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, property or attribute of the other and is 
transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides. It is by means of a 
series of identifications that the personality is constituted and specified” (205). As 
indicated by Laplanche and Pontalis, spectators are not necessarily conscious of the ways 
in which they are engaging in processes of identification during their immediate viewing 
of a film or television program. Instead of a complete and totalizing search for oneself on 
screen, Laplanche and Pontalis’ theory of spectatorial identification is processual and 
incomplete; identification is not predicated on the spectator’s ability to identify her total 
“self” in another character on screen. Rather, there can be partial identifications, such as 
the identification with particular attributes (be they a mode of dress, a behavioural 
attribute, a part of the body, or even a gesture or an expression), or there can also be 
identification with the camera and the spectator’s own position of “looking” (Metz 56). 
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This partial and incomplete nature of identification outlined by Laplanche and Pontalis 
serves as a critical departure from popular televisual definitions of identification as the 
search for oneself on screen. As such, spectatorial identifications can be conceptualized 
as a series of shifting and contradictory positions, revealing this process to be as equally 
unstable as identify itself (Mayne 27). 
While televisual analyses of spectatorial identification often exclude an 
examination of the unconscious, it is challenging to analyze the psychic mechanisms at 
work through ethnographic methodologies; spectators are not necessarily conscious of the 
process by which they engage in spectatorial identifications. Thus, it is the work of 
theorizing the specificity of one’s own spectatorial position that will not only account for 
this methodological shortcoming, but also reconceptualize televisual spectatorial 
identification as something that may exceed the search for oneself onscreen. As Mayne 
notes: 
[The] notion of a subject position is crucial to the rethinking of cinematic 
identification – the notion, that is, that when I enter the movie theatre and 
take my seat, I have already, on several levels (conscious as well as 
unconscious), engaged in an identificatory process. I have assumed a place 
within the cinematic apparatus, I have accepted its fictions, whether self-
consciously or not. The cinematic institution positions me long before I 
have “identified” with a favorite actor or character. (26-27) 
 For heterosexual spectators, then, coming to watch The L Word always already 
involves a process of identification. This acquisition of a specific viewing position by the 
spectatorial subject not only accounts for spectators’ multiple interpretive possibilities, 
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but also challenges the supposed supremacy of the “active” (and largely conscious) 
Cultural Studies viewer during meaning production (Stacey 38-39). The viewing process 
is not a neutral one; each spectator brings her own social, cultural, and subjective 
experiences with which to interpret the events on screen, offering spectators different 
affordances and constraints in terms of identification and desire. Consequently, 
ethnographic methodologies may not necessarily reveal the complicated manner in which 
female heterosexual spectators may view a show like The L Word. 
 
Television: A Social Technology and Signifying Practice 
If spectators are neither passive subjects, nor “free” acting viewers, what are the ways in 
which the television apparatus addresses them as social subjects? How does this process 
of spectatorial positioning influence spectators’ subjective formations? In order to 
explore how television, like the cinema, engages viewers subjectively, I will turn to de 
Lauretis formative theory of the cinema as both a social technology – “a working of the 
codes (a machine, institution, apparatus producing images and meanings for, and together 
with, a subject’s vision)” – and a signifying practice – “a work of semiosis, which 
engages desire and positions the subject in the very process of vision, looking, and 
seeing” (Alice Doesn’t 59). Since I have made it my task to recognize spectatorship as the 
intersection between “viewers” and “subjects,” I have excluded the term “audience(s)” 
from my proceeding discussion; this term tends to massify spectators into an 
undifferentiated viewing population, failing to account for difference between, and even 
within, spectators’ possibilities for identification. 
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In her seminal text Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema de Lauretis 
describes the cinema as a semiotic and material apparatus through which the individual is 
not only addressed as subject, but also formed by her provisional encounter with 
historical formations and codes. According to de Lauretis, “the social being is constructed 
day by day as the point of articulation of ideological formations, an always provisional 
encounter of subject and codes at the historical (therefore changing) intersection of social 
formations and her or his personal history” (Alice Doesn’t 14). For de Lauretis, the extent 
to which spectators engage in processes of subjective formation through viewing is 
influenced by how they are positioned in relation to ideology; that is to say, images are 
not neutral objects of pure perception, but rather significant images. As de Lauretis 
argues, “each person goes to the movies with a semiotic history, personal and social, a 
series of previous identifications by which she and he are historical subjects, 
continuously engaged in a multiplicity of signifying practices” (Alice Doesn’t 145). Thus, 
the image is already overdetermined for the spectator, affording her a specific viewing 
position from which to “look,” interpret, and identify with that which is represented on 
screen. 
While the spectator is not a “free” agent who can simply “choose” how 
representations address and engage her personally and subjectively, the process by which 
the spectator attributes meaning to images is neither fixed, nor entirely conscious. Rather, 
this process of meaning attribution is both continuous and provisional; although the codes 
and social formations of the cinema may define positions of meaning for the spectator, 
she is able to rework those positions into a personal and subjective construction (de 
Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t 14). In other words, through the spectator’s engagement with the 
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cinema “one places oneself or is placed in social reality, and so perceives and 
comprehends as subjective (referring to, even originating in, oneself) those relations – 
material, economic, and interpersonal – which are in fact social and, in larger perspective, 
historical” (de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t 159). This “placement” engenders the spectator in 
a series of social relations, providing the spectator with the opportunity to attribute 
particular meanings, values, and affective significance to the image. It is during this 
process of meaning attribution that the spectator experiences the creation of a sense of 
“self” that is formed in relation to the world external to the viewing process and the 
images on screen. Thus, the spectator’s personal and subjective experiences both inform 
and are informed by her engagement with the image on screen; the complex nexus of 
effects between the social, historical, and subjective (conscious and unconscious) 
experiences offers the spectator particular viewing positions and self-images (de Lauretis, 
Alice Doesn’t 37).  
Although there are differences between television and the cinema (the space 
within which viewing occurs, and the episodic and serialized nature of television 
programming, offers television and cinema spectators different modes of engagement) 
both forms of spectatorship can be viewed as processes of subjectification. Like the 
cinema, the televisual apparatus offers a particular vantage point from which spectators 
can view the images on screen (one that often fits within the current ideological 
framework). However, each individual spectator is able to engage with images differently 
based on the social, historical, and subjective (conscious and unconscious) positions 
within which they are situated. This difference provides the spectator with the 
opportunity to interpret the image through the lens of her own experience; the image is 
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interpreted as subjective (whereby the spectator appears to attributes what appears to be 
her own meaning, values, and affective significance to the image), but it is, at the same 
time, profoundly social and historical. It is during this process of meaning attribution that 
the spectator not only experiences the creation of a sense of “self” but also assists in this 
process of her self-creation. 
 
Eccentric Spectatorship 
While the televisual apparatus may define positions of meaning for the spectator, de 
Lauretis’ theory of the cinema as a social technology and a signifying practice 
acknowledges the possibility for the spectator to rework those positions through the 
particularity of her own personal and subjective experience; what the spectator 
experiences intimately as her own is also a social and historical construction. How, then, 
does The L Word address heterosexual spectators? What possibilities for identification 
does this process of spectatorial positioning offer spectators, and what do spectatorial 
identifications say about the ways in which spectators come to understand their sense of 
“self” and the world around them? In order to answer this question, it is necessary for me 
to consider the extent to which spectatorial identifications are binding forces, revealing 
the ways in which spectators are always already implicated in the ideology of 
heterosexuality. 
Before I begin, it must be noted that the language used in the literature to discuss 
spectatorship is limited; the categories of “heterosexual spectator” and “the lesbian” are 
often deployed as self-evident concepts. For the purpose of my argument, I will continue 
to use this terminology when critically engaging with the literature. However, when I am 
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using the term “heterosexual spectator” or “the lesbian,” I will be referring to an 
operation of power where by the spectator is positioned in a totalizing manner through an 
ideological address; the spectatorial subject is assumed to be a stable and undifferentiated 
figure. I have attempted to make this important distinction through the use of scare 
quotes. 
As referenced above, much of the current literature discussing the ways in which 
The L Word addresses heterosexual spectators is divided into two general modes of 
analysis. The first camp conceptualizes heterosexual modes of viewing The L Word as 
entirely normative, discussing women’s consumption of fashion, glamour, and beauty in 
their “identification” with the hegemonically feminine characters on the show. 
Consequently, this mode of analysis assumes that The L Word only addresses the 
spectator as a normative heterosexual subject, constructing the spectator as one who is 
incapable of experiencing same-sex desire. 
Addressed as a normative heterosexual subject, the spectator is offered 
positionalities of identification and desire that are bound to sexual difference; she may 
only adopt a distant, voyeuristic viewing position because it is assumed that she cannot 
identify with a lesbian character’s desire for other women. Here, identification is defined 
in literal terms; the spectator must identify with a character that approximates her own 
gendered or sexual identity. The most appropriate way for “heterosexual spectators” to 
engage in processes of identification then is through the show’s heterosexual characters: 
specifically, Jenny and Kit. (It must be noted both Jenny and Kit are initially introduced 
as heterosexual women. As the series develops, however, Kit remains the only primary 
heterosexual character on The L Word, while Jenny ultimately identifies as a lesbian). As 
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a result, the spectator can only identify with the figure of the lesbian insofar as she can 
“see” a part of her gendered “self” in that character, be it the character’s clothing, hair, 
make-up, etc. This process unintentionally conflates a character’s sexuality with her 
gendered identity, and The L Word ultimately fails to “queer” the very content of 
normative gender ideology. 
This ability to see her “self” represented affords the spectator specific pleasures 
and privileges; she is addressed as a coherent social subject, and is able to take comfort in 
that recognition. In other words, the spectator has been successfully interpellated into the 
heteronormative structure of identification and desire; she has been inscribed by the 
ideology of heterosexuality, which has completely determined her spectatorial viewing 
position. Addressed in this way, the spectator is free from experiencing an internal 
contradiction between her identifications and sexual identity external to the viewing 
process. 
The second mode of analysis does recognize the possibility for spectators to 
experience same-sex desire. By adopting a fantasmic mode of viewing, the “heterosexual 
spectator” is drawn into the narrative and is able to identify with queer subject positions. 
More specifically, the spectator is able to imagine a “lesbian” character’s desires as her 
own. However, this notion of fantasy often confines the spectator’s experience of same-
sex desire to the immediate viewing process; any same-sex desire the spectator 
experiences (if at all) has no bearing on her subjectivity. This desire is temporary, and it 
does not affect how the spectator makes sense of her “self” as a heterosexual subject. The 
assumption, then, is that the spectator is able to temper the internal contradiction that 
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arises between her fantasmic experiences of same-sex desire and her avowed sexual 
identity. 
Although the academic attention exploring the ways in which The L Word 
addresses heterosexual spectators has been largely normative, I question the extent to 
which this is the only means by which The L Word may address heterosexual spectators. I 
am convinced that there is something else at work: that there exists a spectatorial subject 
who is both inside and outside the ideology of heterosexuality – one who is not only able 
to experience same-sex desire, but who is also conscious of this twofold pull, this “double 
vision” (de Lauretis, Technologies of Gender 10). But what does it mean, then, to identify 
as a heterosexual woman and to engage in processes of identification and desire that 
exceed the limits of heterosexuality itself? To what extent does a spectator’s position in 
relation to the ideology of heterosexuality allow her to exceed the ways in which The L 
Word addresses her as a heterosexual subject? In order to posit the existence of this other 
spectatorial position, I will turn to de Lauretis’ theory of the “eccentric subject.”  
In her essay “Eccentric Subjects” de Lauretis asserts that an eccentric subjectivity 
is a theory of the unconscious as excess (Figures of Resistance 162). According to de 
Lauretis, “to understand the unconscious ‘as a point of resistance’ and to take into 
account its specific ability to exceed the mechanisms of social determination can lead to 
the realization of another crucial aspect of agency” (Figures of Resistance 162). For de 
Lauretis, then, this eccentric subjectivity is a point of psychic resistance; it is “a point of 
view, or an eccentric discursive position outside the male (hetero)sexual monopoly of 
power/knowledge – which is to say, a point of view excessive to, or not contained by, the 
sociocultural institution of heterosexuality” (Figures of Resistance 163). It is in this 
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moment the individual recognizes that her “self” does not align with the dominant 
ideology by which she (as a social subject) is being “hailed” or addressed. This eccentric 
subject position is thus also a site of consciousness; the ideological message fails to 
completely determine the individual’s subjective formation.  
This interstitial space both inside and outside the ideology of heterosexuality is 
riddled with contradiction and anxiety for the spectator; there is significant displeasure in 
failing to see oneself represented. Despite these alienating effects, this eccentric position 
does offer the spectator a different kind of pleasure, one that occurs through the 
acquisition of a critical and reflexive consciousness of not being “recognized.” Here the 
spectatorial subject must come to terms with the knowledge that she is not the spoken 
subject; although she has been shaped by the ideology of heterosexuality, she does not fit 
within its current normative structure of identification and desire. 
This rejection of the institution of heterosexuality and the spectator’s refusal to 
center herself within in it is as much a moment of potentiality as it is a moment of 
contradiction and anxiety. The agential efficacy of this eccentric subject position requires 
the capacity to move beyond the conceptual constraints associated with the binary terms 
“heterosexuality” and “homosexuality” (de Lauretis, Figures of Resistance 162). Rather 
than an “incomplete” or “unachieved” heterosexuality, then, this eccentric subjectivity is 
excessive; it is something other than the category of heterosexuality itself  (de Lauretis, 
Figures of Resistance 180). As such, the spectator is offered the possibility to “re-anchor” 
her “self” in a multitude of discursive positions; she is at once heterosexual, and not quite 
heterosexual (de Lauretis, Figures of Resistance 172). The contradictory and uneasy 
existence of the spectator’s “self” in multiple locations undermines any notion of her 
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avowed sexual identity external to the viewing process as one that is singular, coherent, 
or completely determined (de Lauretis, Figures of Resistance 172). This eccentric subject 
position is one that is shifting; it is always already in a state of flux. 
In this moment of eccentric recognition, the spectator realizes that her experience 
of same-sex desire does not align with her sense of “self” as a normative heterosexual 
subject. She recognizes her “self” as a distinct subject, one that does not fit within the 
confines of the current heteronormative structure of identification and desire. She is at the 
same time both inside and outside the ideology of heterosexuality, feeling the effects of 
this twofold ideological “pull.” This self-displacement, this continual dislocation is 
accompanied by an epistemological shift, one that involves both the corporeal and 
psychic “self”; it is a shift in consciousness (de Lauretis, Figures of Resistance 74). It is 
in this contradictory moment that the spectator not only experiences the creation of an 
eccentric sense of “self,” but also assists in this process of her self-creation. As a result, 
spectatorial identifications are revealed to be as equally unstable as identity itself (Mayne 
27). 
Spectatorial identifications perform a crucial role in the formation of a spectator’s 
eccentric subjectivity. Although the spectator may be addressed as a normative 
heterosexual subject, this address does not solely determine the spectator’s possibilities 
for identification and desire. The address “speaks” to each individual spectator differently 
based on the social, cultural, and subjective (conscious and unconscious) positions within 
which she is situated, offering her a specific spectatorial position. The specificity of this 
spectatorial positioning offers the spectator the possibility to engage in processes of 
identification and desire that exceed the current heteronormative structure – a structure 
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that is predicated on the maintenance of sexual difference. As such, the spectator is able 
to not only engage in spectatorial identifications that exceed the search for her “self” of 
screen, but also experience same-sex desire. It is this experience of same-sex desire that 
transforms the spectator’s subjectivity (consciously and unconsciously), re-orienting her 
relationship to her past and present viewing experiences (White 197). This shift in the 
spectator’s subjectivity points to the existence of another spectatorial position that is 
excessive to the limits of heterosexuality. The spectator’s subjectivity is complex at the 
level of gender and sexuality, constructing her spectatorial position as one that is 
eccentric to her interpellation. Thus, the specificity of one’s spectatorial positioning has 
the potential to exceed the ways in which The L Word may address the spectator as a 
normative heterosexual subject; sexuality is no longer solely constitutive of identity, but 
is inextricably linked to gender. 
In order to distinguish this process as something other, something that exceeds the 
category of heterosexuality, I have borrowed de Lauretis’ terminology and termed it 
“eccentric.” This concept of eccentricity serves as a critical departure from popular 
televisual definitions of identification as seeing a part of oneself in a character. Rather 
than a complete and totalizing search for oneself on screen, eccentric identifications are 
processual and incomplete; they are binding forces, revealing the ways in which we are 
positioned in relation to ideology. This theory of eccentricity, then, is one of potentiality; 
it is an investigation of the process by which spectators become eccentric subjects – a 
subject that is always becoming. 
*** 
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My preoccupation with eccentricity, then, is to address the fissures and moments 
of excess in the visual and narrative dimensions of The L Word in order to acknowledge 
the existence of a contradictory spectatorial subject that is unaccounted for by current 
televisual analyses of spectatorship. As I will continue to argue, there is a specific “type” 
of heterosexual subject that watches and enjoys The L Word at the outset – one who is 
able to experience same-sex desire precisely because she is always already excessive to 
the category of heterosexuality itself. Perhaps, then, it is a condition of possibility of the 
show that one steps outside of the normative heterosexuality, if only at the level of 
fantasy. As such, this spectator is not solely determined by the institution of 
heterosexuality, but is rather, at the same time, both inside and outside of it. In a word, 
she is eccentric. 
*** 
In the following pages, this thesis will develop a theory of eccentric potentiality in 
order to explore how the specificity of one’s spectatorial positioning may exceed the 
ways in which one is addressed by The L Word as a heterosexual subject, revealing the 
instability of both identity, and processes of identification and desire. This research will 
engage with feminist film theories of spectatorship alongside Cultural Studies’ 
contributions on the “active” viewer by acknowledging spectators as both social and 
psychic subjects. More specifically, I will explore the ways in which the internal, psychic 
mechanisms and unconscious processes (i.e., desire and fantasy) at work in the spectator 
influence and are influenced by the external, social and cultural positions (i.e., race, 
gender, class, sexuality) within which the spectator is situated, ultimately structuring 
spectators’ possibilities for identification. By reintroducing questions of the unconscious, 
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this research seeks to not only challenge the privileged and “rational” status associated 
with conscious thought, but also address the complex process by which spectators, as 
gendered and sexual subjects, make sense of and articulate their identifications beyond 
their immediate engagement with The L Word (Mayne 37). 
Incorporating this interdisciplinary approach, chapter one will begin with my own 
eccentric account of the infamous “pool scene” from season one of The L Word. By 
retroactively outlining the specificity of my own spectatorial position, I will work 
through the ways in which individual spectators may respond to the different ideological 
modes of address in the show. This case study will include a formal analysis of the ways 
in which the camera work, narrative, and visual images engage viewers subjectively, 
offering spectators eccentric positionalities of identification and desire. 
Chapter two will focus on the multiple ways in which spectators respond to the 
experience of eccentric spectatorship when watching The L Word. As I will suggest, 
eccentric identifications and desires have material and psychic effects that extend beyond 
the immediate viewing process. To make my argument, this chapter will include a case 
study of The L Word’s fan-favourite, androgynous lesbian Shane McCutcheon (played by 
Katherine Moennig). This section will not only analyze how the figure of Shane is 
depicted on screen, but also discuss the ways in which straight-identified spectators have 
received this character external to the viewing process. I will argue that it is through the 
ways in which spectators articulate their identifications with and desires for the figure of 
Shane that they are able to make sense of and articulate their experience of eccentricity to 
themselves and others. 
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The final chapter, chapter three, will situate this research in relation to feminist 
and queer theories of spectatorship. More specifically, I will address how this theory of 
eccentric spectatorship and excessive subjectivity offers something else that is not 
necessarily accounted for by the terms queer, bisexuality, and other forms of woman-
identification (both sexual and non-sexual). This section will conclude with a brief 
discussion of how psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious can be useful to the study 
of contemporary televisual analyses of spectatorship. The aim of this research is to 
acknowledge television spectatorship as a process of subjectification; the spectator not 
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Eccentrically Viewing The L Word 
 
She walks over to the fence. 
Curious. 
Jenny. 
She heard the two women talking. 
They’re talking about swimming. 
Walking towards the pool. 
One woman takes off her shirt. Her pants. Then her boyish underwear. 
Full bush. 
The other woman pulls her blue floral-print dress over her head. 
Revealing red panties. 
She ducks behind the fence, peering through the wooden slats. 
Everyone says she hides because she’s embarrassed. 
No. I don’t think so. 
It’s the look in her eyes. It’s the way she parts her lips. 
I know. 
She wants to watch. But she doesn’t want to be seen. 
The two women get wet. 
It’s hot. Very hot. 
They kiss. 
They fuck. 
One woman moans, already close to coming. 
She watches. 
Curious. 
I watch her. 
Curious. 
The sound of fucking in the background. 
She looks away. 
Looks down and closes her eyes. 
Smiles. (I think). 
I can’t believe they’re showing this on TV. 
 
*** 
How can the specificity of one’s own spectatorial positioning exceed the ways in 
which The L Word addresses her as a heterosexual subject? What are the ways in which 
The L Word offers spectators the possibility to engage in processes of eccentric 
identifications? To begin answering these questions, this chapter will include a close 
formal analysis in order to examine the ways in which The L Word may address a 
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heterosexual spectator, and how processes of spectatorial positioning may exceed this 
mode of address. 
 
 “Same Sex. Different City.” 
The L Word’s attempt to appeal to a broad-based viewership could not be more evident 
than in the show’s initial marketing campaign: “Same sex. Different city.” While this 
marketing slogan attempted to draw comparisons between The L Word and HBO’s 
(mostly heterosexual) hit show Sex and the City, (our long-time friends from Manhattan 
share with our Los Angeles lesbians an equally glamorous life of partying, sex, and 
relationship woes), there is one facet of The L Word that separates this show from all the 
rest: lesbian sexuality. As the first show in television history to center on the lives of a 
group of (mostly) lesbian women, The L Word has been tasked with introducing the 
world of lesbian sexuality (or at least a version of this world) to spectators. And it is 
precisely because season one must introduce spectators to the “L World” that this series 
becomes of interest to my account of eccentric spectatorship. 
While historically the figure of the lesbian on television has been confined to de-
sexualized narratives surrounding parenting or “coming out,” The L Word sought to 
distance itself from these “predictable” storylines at the outset (Warn 5). To use Sarah 
Warn’s terms, The L Word “explores the ups and downs of the personal and professional 
lives of several women who are already (my emphasis) comfortable with their sexuality” 
(6). In the pilot episode, we are first introduced to long-term lesbian couple Bette Porter – 
who is a strong and successful half African American and half Caucasian woman – and 
her soft-spoken partner Tina Kennard. The monogamous pair is attempting to start a 
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family through artificial insemination, and Tina has recently left her job to prepare herself 
and her shared house with Bette for the arrival of their future baby. Then there is aspiring 
writer Jenny Schecter. At the beginning of the first season, Jenny is constructed as naïve, 
timid, and unsure about herself; she has recently moved to Los Angeles to be with her 
long-term boyfriend (and eventually fiancée) Tim Haspel. As the first season develops, 
however, Jenny is depicted struggling with her sexual identity. After being seduced by 
Marina Ferrer – the sexy and statuesque owner of the local lesbian watering hole “The 
Planet” – Jenny is conflicted about her feelings for Tim (although Jenny eventually 
identifies as a lesbian in season two of the series).  
While Jenny is subject to a “coming out” storyline in season one and two, her 
struggle to understand her sexuality is the primary narrative arc through which the 
spectator is introduced to the “L World.” The remaining cast of characters in season one 
include: Bette’s previously estranged half sister Kit (who is the only African American 
woman in the series, and who also just happens to be the only primary heterosexual 
character); capricious bisexual Alice Pieszecki (who is obsessed with charting her 
friends’ sexual escapades); the closeted tennis star Dana Fairbanks, and finally; The L 
Word’s fan favourite androgynous lesbian Shane McCutcheon. 
 
Imaging, Narrativity, Camera Work 
With a range of characters and multiple seasons, how does The L Word address 
spectators? What are the ways in which this process of spectatorial positioning offers 
spectators specific positionalities of identification and desire? As mentioned previously, 
current televisual analyses of The L Word are often limited to representational 
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discussions. The visual image is given primacy over all other film techniques, limiting 
discussions of spectatorship to the search for oneself on screen. That is not to say that 
analyses of the narrative and camera work have been completely ignored. However, such 
analyses are often introduced to describe how the figure of the lesbian is represented on 
screen; there is very little discussion of how the narrative and camera work function in 
relation to spectatorial identifications. This overemphasis on the visual image of “the 
lesbian” neglects how the complex nexus of effects between the narrative and camera 
work, in addition to the visual images, offer spectators multiple (and even contradictory) 
possibilities for identification and desire.  
The ways in which spectators not only interpret, but also attribute meaning and 
affective significance to the image of “the lesbian” is a complex process. According to de 
Lauretis, “perception and signification are neither direct or simple reproduction (copy, 
mimesis, reflection) nor inevitably predetermined by biology, anatomy, or destiny” (Alice 
Doesn’t 55). For de Lauretis, relations of vision and meaning are produced through the 
effects of “imaging,” which de Lauretis defines as “the processes of the articulation of 
meaning to images, the engagement of subjectivity in that process, and thus the mapping 
of a social vision into subjectivity” (Alice Doesn’t 39). In other words, images do not 
carry any intrinsic meaning for spectators; the figure of the lesbian is neither inherently 
“good” nor “bad.” It is precisely because images do not carry any intrinsic meaning that 
they must be analyzed in conjunction with narrativity; it is only through the work of 
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narrativity 3 that the spectator is able to not only “see,” but also attribute meaning and 
affective significance to images. 
Narrativity is thus a condition of possibility for spectatorial identification; it is a 
mechanism of coherence that has the capacity to “direct, sustain, or undercut 
identification” (de Lauretis, Technologies of Gender 108-109). According to de Lauretis, 
“the very work of narrativity is the engagement of the subject in certain positionalities of 
meaning and desire” (Alice Doesn’t 106). In other words, the spectator’s subjectivity is 
engaged through the work of narrativity and is subsequently constituted in relation to 
narrative, meaning, and desire. As a result, there can be no earlier “primitive, primary, or 
purely imagistic identification” (de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t 80). For de Lauretis, then, 
positions of identification and visual pleasure are the “after-effects of an engagement of 
subjectivity in the relations of meaning; relations which involve and mutually bind image 
and narrative” (Alice Doesn’t 80). That is to say, both meaning and vision depend on the 
engagement of a historically and socially constituted subjectivity – a subjectivity that 
exists prior to the spectator’s encounter with the televisual text (de Lauretis, Alice 
Doesn’t 149). Each spectator’s location in social relations of gender, race, class, 
sexuality, etc. may either be in contradiction or unison with their “internal” 
configurations. This difference between (and even within) spectators affects the extent to 
which filmic conventions engage spectators subjectively; thus, the work of these filmic 
conventions “speak” to spectators differently, offering them specific positions from 
which to view a televisual text (de Lauretis, Practice of Love 129).  
                                                
3 It must be noted that there is an important distinction between narrative and narrativity. 
Unlike narrative, which focuses on the structure of the story itself, narrativity is 
concerned with the work and discursive effects of narrative in producing a specific 
subject of vision. 
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The work of imaging and narrativity are necessary components of spectatorial 
identifications; images are always already implicated with narrativity and overdetermined 
by its inscription of positionalities of meaning and desire (de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t 
149). However, the way in which the camera frames the events on screen for the 
spectator can serve to either support or contradict the effects of imaging and narrativity. 
Thus, it is the complex nexus of effects between imaging, narrativity, and camera work 
that constitute the terms and positionalities of identification and desire for spectators (de 
Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t 137). 
*** 
The proceeding discussion will attempt to work through the ways in which 
individual spectators respond to different modes of address used within The L Word by 
offering my own account of eccentric spectatorial positioning. It must be noted, however, 
that my analysis of The L Word is not a self-evident observation; it is experienced 
(consciously and unconsciously) though a multitude of discursive formations that exist 
prior to my encounter with the text (Stacey 74). As such, the specificity of spectatorial 
positioning necessitates a discussion of my own subject position. This articulation of my 
own social, historical, and subjective experiences is central to my account of eccentricity 
and feminist accounts of spectatorship. 
*** 
I am a bi-racial woman who grew up in a working-class, conservative family in 
Edmonton, Alberta. My father was a welder from Port aux Basques, Newfoundland, and 
my mother immigrated to Canada from Malaysia when she was in her early twenties. 
Since my mother only completed an equivalent of grade eight schooling, my father was 
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the sole economic provider for our family. Money was tight when I was growing up, 
although I did not know this at the time. However, it was precisely because money was 
scarce that I developed a love for television. All of our family time was spent watching 
the tube. You could turn off your brain, watch, and relax. The stress of the workday 
would melt away. 
I never thought to question whether or not I was like everyone else when I was 
growing up. “We’re middle-class,” my mother would tell me. “But if anyone asks what 
your father does, tell them it’s none of their business!” My mother was not embarrassed 
by our family. She truly believed that we were just like everyone else. But in some ways, 
she knew. She knew that telling other people what my father did for a living would risk 
revealing the middle-class façade that both of my parents had spent so much time and 
money to create. 
Eventually, the familial pressure for me to become a “professional” drove me to 
the academy. (My parents wanted me to have a career with a “stable” income so that I 
would not have to worry about money like they did). It was during my time as an 
undergraduate that I came to feminism. I gravitated toward studying theories of sexuality 
since my parents refrained from discussing anything related to sex when I was growing 
up. I never felt as though the term “heterosexual” encapsulated the complexity of my own 
subjective experiences with sexuality, and for the first time I was given a language to talk 
about it. It was refreshing to read well-articulated formulations of my own jumbled 
thoughts that I had had for years. This opportunity to speak about sexuality with others in 
a way that I could never have done before excited me. I knew that if I had to become a 
“professional,” I wanted to do something that I liked: watch television and talk about sex. 
  41 
Although feminism had given me this new perspective from which to think about 
the world around me, I never imagined that I would ever become the subject of this mode 
of theorizing. While I thrived academically in university, it was the first time in my life 
that I felt working-class. This recognition, this newfound consciousness was neither 
“liberating” nor a moment of possibility; it was paralyzing (and still continues to be). 
How, then, does one begin to articulate a personal history of the everyday, intangible 
effects of class when one exists in a space that treats (or at least attempts to treat) all 
students as equals? For now I am neither that blue-collar kid from years ago, nor will I 
ever be the intellectual who can share her ideas without having to fear that her words will 
reveal her “secret” – that she really isn’t one of them. In the professional academy, I will 
always be somewhere in-between, forever residing in this interstitial space riddled with 
contradiction and anxiety. 
I will always feel out of place.  
It is this feeling of displacement and dislocation that has greatly informed my own 
spectatorial subject position. The everyday effects of experiencing difference at the level 
of gender, race, class, and sexuality has drove me to search for that ephemeral 
spectatorial position somewhere inside and outside the ideology of heterosexuality. It is 
precisely because I no longer feel at home when I am addressed as a normative 
heterosexual subject that I know (either consciously or unconsciously) I cannot be the 
only one. 
*** 
Although The L Word offers a plethora of scenes from which one can choose to 
explore the complex ways in which spectators view the series, the best way for me to 
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situate myself within the current academic discussion is to offer my own analysis of the 
most talked-about scene in the series: the first pool scene from the pilot episode. 
The pool scene opens with a medium shot of Jenny (see Table 1.1). In this shot, 
Jenny is depicted setting up her writing studio in a converted garage behind the house 
that she shares with her boyfriend Tim. (At this point in the narrative, Jenny has recently 
arrived in Los Angeles to live with Tim, and she has yet to encounter the lesbian 
characters who are a part of the series’ cast). Jenny soon hears the sound of her 
neighbors’ backdoor close and overhears two women talking. She stops her work and 
leaves her studio to investigate (the camera tracking her movement). As Jenny 
approaches the fence, there is a straight cut to a close-up shot of the back of Jenny’s head. 
We can see that she is looking over the fence at the two women talking (one of which the 
spectator knows is Shane), making their way towards the outdoor pool. (The women are 
framed by a medium-shot). The two women, having discussed the prospect of swimming, 
begin to undress. Jenny ducks behind the fence (again, the camera tracking her 
movement), and the shot cuts to another close-up of Jenny. This time, we see Jenny 
peering out from the opposite side of the fence, her face barely visible behind the wooden 
slats. There is another straight cut to a medium-long shot of the two naked women. 
Unlike the previous shots, this one is filmed with a handheld camera and is internally 
framed; there are vertical lines blocking our vision. Because the previous shot depicted 
Jenny peering out from behind the fence, it can be assumed that this current shot is from 
Jenny’s point of view. This shot-reverse-shot technique sutures the spectator’s gaze; we 
are now privileged with Jenny’s line of vision, seeing what she sees. From this point-of-
view shot, the handheld camera shakes ever so slightly as it tilts left to right, tracking the 
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movement of the two women undressing by the pool. The subsequent shots depict Jenny 
watching the two women begin to have sex from behind the fence. 
Much of the current literature analyzing this pool scene assumes that the events 
depicted on screen are easily observable and self-evident. If we recount Moore’s analysis 
of the pool scene (referenced in the introductory section of this thesis), Moore indicates 
that Jenny “ducks” behind the fence out of embarrassment after catching a glimpse of 
Shane and the unknown woman undressing for a swim. For Moore, Jenny’s 
embarrassment is what drives her to watch the two women from a distant, voyeuristic 
viewing position. At this isolated moment in the narrative development, Jenny is 
heterosexual and is only able to experience voyeuristic pleasure rather than same-sex 
desire. 
Since Jenny approximates the heterosexual spectator’s own gender and sexual 
identity, Moore contends that the heterosexual spectator is able to adopt Jenny’s eye-line 
as her own; like Jenny in this particular scene, the heterosexual spectator is a “‘straight’ 
tourist” within this new and unfamiliar “L World” (“Having It All Ways” 8). 
While Moore’s analysis suggests that the camera work and narrative plot 
primarily function to provide the heterosexual spectator with an entry point into the world 
of lesbian desire (unlike the “queer” spectator, the heterosexual spectator is not in “the 
know”), “heteroflexibility” is only one possible mode by which spectators may view The 
L Word. In fact, the work of the filmic conventions that both Moore and I describe in this 
particular scene actually function to offer all spectators a voyeuristic position. If we 
recall, the spectator’s gaze has been successfully sutured through the use of a shot-
reverse-shot. Privileged with Jenny’s point-of-view from behind the fence, the spectator 
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sees what she sees, which is in effect what the camera sees. This voyeuristic viewing 
position from behind the fence is distanced; it does not necessitate identification with the 
lesbian couple in the pool. Rather, in this moment pleasure is experienced through the act 
of looking without being “seen.” 
For straight-identified spectators, this voyeurism provides exactly what The L 
Word promises: a glimpse into the world of lesbian desire. For the queer spectator, 
however, the distancing effect of the camera produces a contradiction: a desire to be “in” 
the pool and not behind the fence. The desire for the queer-identified woman to be “in” 
the pool may result in her refusal of the distancing effect of the camera. Instead of 
identifying with the “look” of the camera, which has been successfully sutured to Jenny’s 
“gaze,” the queer spectator may in fact identify with the lesbian couple in the pool – a 
longing to participate. Unlike the heterosexual spectator, this queer-identified spectator 
needs no introduction to the world of lesbian sexuality and same-sex desire. In fact, it is 
her familiarity with this “L World” depicted on screen that constitutes her as a subject 
that is more willing to “jump in” the pool at the outset. For example, both shot five and 
shot eight of the pool scene are overhead crane shots depicting the lesbian couple in the 
pool (see Table 1.1). Although these two shots are cut in montage with Jenny’s point-of-
view, they are an unobstructed vantage point to which Jenny could not possibly be privy. 
While these crane shots are not close-ups, they offer the queer-identified spectator a 
position that is unsutured to Jenny’s look: it is a position that is already “in the pool.” In 
this moment, The L Word renders lesbian sexuality visible, opening queer spectators’ 
identity to the types of voyeurism the show promises to straight-identified viewers. For 
the queer spectator, then, seeing oneself on screen is also an exposure of oneself. As a 
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result, The L Word successfully invites spectators to “have it all ways,” to use Moore’s 
term (“Having it All Ways” 3). 
Although the heterosexual spectator may enter the “L World” voyeuristically 
through the character of Jenny, the spectator is not necessarily bound to this specific 
viewing position through the duration of the series. In addition to this voyeuristic viewing 
position, there are also alterative avenues through which straight-identified women can 
view this scene differently; voyeurism may provide heterosexual spectators with an entry 
point into this world of lesbian sexuality, but something else happens to the spectator 
once she is “in” this “L World.” 
To return to Moore’s analysis of the pool scene, Jenny’s “crossing the fence” in 
future episodes subsequently “queers” the straight spectator’s mode of viewing since she 
has initially accepted Jenny’s eye line as her own (“Having It All Ways” 10). This 
“queering” constitutes Jenny as a “safely ambiguous place” from which straight-
identified spectators can experiment (Moore, “Having It All Ways” 10). More 
specifically, this heteroflexible viewing position provides straight-identified spectators 
access to the “local” imaginary of the “L World,” presenting them with the opportunity to 
share in the same “queer sensibility” with which queer-identified spectators are already 
familiar (Moore, “Having It All Ways” 20). Rather than maintain a distant and 
voyeuristic viewing position behind the fence, the heterosexual spectator may now be 
more willing to jump “in” the pool and adopt Jenny’s desires as her own; the straight 
spectator is encouraged to “cross the fence” along with Jenny, if only at the level of 
fantasy. As a result, Jenny’s gaze from behind the fence is now reflected as an act of 
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curious contemplation for her character and for the straight spectator: one can either stay 
behind the fence and watch from a distance, or jump “in” the pool. 
*** 
While the filmic conventions used in the pool scene may encourage straight-
identified spectators to engage in either voyeuristic or fantasmic modes of viewing, what 
happens to the spectator’s viewing position in subsequent sex scenes when Jenny is either 
involved in the same-sex encounter depicted on screen or completely absent from the 
scene itself? 
The second same-sex sex scene in the series is very different from the first; this 
time, Jenny is no longer a distant observer, but is rather an active participant. The scene 
opens with a tracking shot (see Table 1.2). Tracking out from behind a curtain, the 
camera reveals a medium long shot of Jenny and Marina kissing on a bed. The shot 
immediately cuts to a medium close-up of the two women kissing. What is particularly 
interesting about this shot (and the others that follow in this scene) is that they are all 
filmed close up with a handheld camera. There is a noticeable unsteadying effect as the 
camera tilts to follow the women’s movement. As the scene progresses, we see Marina 
pleasuring Jenny who appears to be close to coming; she is moaning, breathing heavily, 
and gasping for air. However, in the final two shots, we realize that Jenny is crying. 
While Jenny’s tears make it unclear as to whether or not she was in fact close to coming, 
we know from the previous shots that she was an active participant (and enjoying it). 
Unlike the first pool scene, the “look” of the camera is not sutured with any one 
of the characters in this second scene; the spectator’s gaze is, in fact, the camera’s. This 
identification with the camera is neither distant, nor voyeuristic; our view is not 
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obstructed as we are with Jenny and Marina in the bedroom, watching them. Without the 
distancing effect of a voyeuristic viewing position, the straight-identified spectator is 
encouraged to participate by “jumping in” to this scene. As Moore would perhaps argue, 
seeing Jenny enjoy her same-sex encounter provides the heterosexual spectator with the 
opportunity to engage in heteroflexibility. (Jenny is, after all, the straight viewer’s entry 
point into the “L World” and primary site of identification). Through Jenny’s 
heteroflexible character, then, the straight-identified spectator may fantasize about 
Jenny’s same-sex encounter, adopting Jenny’s pleasures as her own. 
While the straight-identified spectator is able to experience same-sex desire 
through her fantasmic participation in this scene, Jenny’s presence has several 
implications for the ways in which this contradictory desire is experienced. More 
specifically, the straight-identified spectator’s fantasmic heteroflexible viewing position 
(adopted through Jenny) enables her to reconcile her experience of same-sex desire with 
her avowed heterosexual identity. Narratively, the spectator can continue to assume that 
Jenny is “straight”; Jenny has yet to completely “cross the fence,” and her tears indicate 
that she is remorseful (or at least troubled) by her same-sex encounter. (Although it is 
ambiguous as to whether or not Jenny is crying over her act of infidelity or her sexual 
activities with a woman). It is precisely because Jenny can continue to be read as 
“straight” by the heterosexual spectator that the spectator’s own feelings of same-sex 
desire are disavowed. Because the spectator herself is straight and thus, according to 
Moore, identifies with the “straight” character Jenny, the spectator’s fantasmic 
experience of same-sex desire is mitigated; it is not experienced as an internal 
contradiction. 
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Like Jenny in this scene, the straight-identified spectator is merely 
“experimenting.” Jenny stands in for an incapacity to render her own sexuality 
intelligible; she represents an unsymbolizable moment of same-sex desire for the 
“straight” spectator as Jenny herself is somewhere in between her heterosexual 
relationship with Tim and her experience of same-sex desire with Marina. Through this 
act of fetishism, then, the straight-identified viewer is able to maintain two contradictory 
positions; she is a heterosexual woman who experiences same-sex desire, but only at the 
level of fantasy. Thus, this contradiction is not experienced as subjectively 
transformative. 
While Jenny’s presence in the second same-sex sex scene makes this act of 
disavowal possible for the straight-identified viewer, there is one final scene near the end 
of the pilot episode that complicates this process of fetishism and disavowal. The scene 
opens with an extreme close-up of two women kissing (see Table 1.3); the sound of 
kissing is audible to the viewers as the women’s tongues intertwine. Narratively, the 
spectator is able to assume that the two women are most likely Bette and Tina. (When we 
last encountered the couple, they were depicted in bed as Bette was climbing on top of 
Tina, presumably to “get it on”). This scene is almost identical to the sex scene with 
Jenny and Marina: it consists of a series of medium close-up and close-up shots that have 
been filmed straight-on at eye level height by a handheld camera. Most importantly, the 
“look” of the camera remains unsutured to either character’s perspective. Again, the 
camera’s perspective locates the spectator in Bette and Tina’s bedroom as we are 
watching them. Unlike the scene with Jenny and Marina, this scene finishes with a 
lengthy thirty-seven second close-up shot where both women unmistakably climax. 
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What makes this (and subsequent) same-sex scene(s) different from the previous 
two is the contradiction that it produces in the straight-identified spectator. In this scene, 
Jenny, the heterosexual spectator’s “safely ambiguous” site of identification, is absent. 
With Jenny’s absence, there is no tenable site of identification that allows the straight-
identified spectator to explicitly disavow her experiences of same-sex desire. Here, the 
straight-identified spectator experiences an internal contradiction between her avowed 
sexual identity and her experience of same-sex desire. This contradiction, though largely 
unconscious, is excessive; it is a felt perturbation that occurs from the confrontation 
between avowed and disavowed; that is, the straight-identified spectator’s sexual identity 
external to the viewing process and her experience of same sex-desire, respectively. 
Although Jenny’s absence may be at first disconcerting for the straight-identified 
spectator, I maintain that her presence is no longer needed. From this point forward, the 
straight-identified spectator has become implicated in the “L World”; she may have 
gained entry through a voyeuristic viewing position, but the spectator can now access this 
“queer sensibility,” to use Moore’s term, on her own (“Having It All Ways” 20). In 
effect, the heterosexual is able to experience same-sex desire through multiple points of 
identification. This specific viewing position locates the spectator both inside and outside 
the ideology of heterosexuality. It is a space where the spectator may not only exceed the 
ways in which The L Word addresses her as a heterosexual subject, but also experience 
different positionalities of identification and desire. In other words, this viewing position 
is an eccentric one; its occupation necessitates the very decentering of normative 
heterosexuality. 
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The spectator’s experience of this excessive subjectivity is not confined to the 
immediate viewing process. The straight-identified spectator is able to exceed the limits 
of heterosexuality because she is an eccentric subject external to her engagement with 
The L Word: and it is precisely because her eccentric subjectivity extends beyond the 
viewing process that she is offered the possibility to experience a desire that is not bound 
to sexual difference. However, for the female heterosexual spectator who is perhaps less 
“heteroflexible,” entry into the “L World” may simply extend the voyeurism of the first 
scene; the spectator may either refuse or repress (or even simply not feel) any feelings of 
same-sex desire. Thus, it is this specificity of the appeal to “flexibility” in The L Word 
that not only upsets normative categories of gender and sexuality, but also constitutes the 
transformative effect of the show for spectators who experience same-sex desire, perhaps 
for the very first time. 
This felt perturbation constitutes an epistemological shift: a shift in 
consciousness. Here, the term consciousness does not necessarily refer to the immediacy 
of knowing for the spectator may come to understand that her spectatorial position is 
excessive only in retrospect. It is possible, however, for the spectator to experience the 
effects of this subjective transformation without necessarily being conscious of what, 
exactly, is happening in that specific moment. As a result, this subjective transformation 
alters the ways in which the spectator makes sense of herself and engages with her social 
and material reality. Thus, the acquisition of this eccentric viewing position is a dynamic 
process; the specificity of one’s spectatorial position is always shifting as one is 
transformed and inscribed (consciously and unconsciously) by a multitude of 
contradictory discursive formations. 
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*** 
If the straight-identified spectator is able to acquire this eccentric viewing 
position through her engagement with The L Word, it may be possible for some 
heterosexual spectators to position themselves outside of the initial voyeuristic position 
(in regards to lesbian desire) at the outset; which is to say, the heterosexual spectator may 
enter this world of lesbian desire through a viewing position that differs from the initial 
voyeuristic entry point of Jenny. 
To return to the pool scene with this newfound eccentric “sensibility,” we can see 
that Jenny’s voyeuristic position is under erasure at the outset. While the “invisible” and 
unobtrusive camera work functions to maintain the narrative and spatio-temporal 
continuity within this scene by orienting the spectator’s line of vision (see Table 1.1) (the 
editing transitions are made with straights cuts and continuous diegetic sound connects 
consecutive shots, all of which contribute to a smooth sequence), the unsteadying effect 
of the handheld camera now contradicts the narrative assumption that Jenny is in fact 
“straight.” For example, in shot twelve of the pool scene (see Table 1.1) there is a 
medium-long shot of Shane and the unknown woman having sex in the pool. Vertical 
lines internally frame this reverse shot; the spectator can assume that this shot is from 
Jenny’s point of view behind the fence. In this moment, the handheld camera produces an 
unsteadying effect as it tilts rapidly from right to left, tracking the movement of the two 
naked women having sex in the pool. Equipped with the knowledge of Jenny’s “crossing 
over” in future episodes, I am now able to interpret and experiencing something else in 
this scene – something that was not within my line of vision during my first screening of 
the series. For me, the camera movement (and subsequently Jenny’s point-of-view) is 
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deliberate and intentional; she is searching for an unobstructed position from which to 
view the two naked women from behind the fence. As a result, Jenny’s decision to hide 
behind the fence is no longer interpreted as one that stems from feelings of 
embarrassment. Rather, her concealed gaze becomes something more than a distant 
voyeurism; it reveals that her sexuality may not necessarily be as stable as it is often 
interpreted in this scene, albeit retroactively.  
It is because of Jenny’s “crossing over” in future episodes that the voyeurism 
promised in this scene is rendered untenable as a site of identification for the heterosexual 
spectator. This viewing position is one that no longer fits within the current 
heteronormative structure of desire as Jenny’s voyeurism becomes too implicated, her 
pleasure too visible: and yet, the straight-identified woman continues to watch. Although 
Jenny may inoculate a specific mode of viewership – namely, to provide a narrative entry 
point for the heterosexual spectator into the “L World” – her own shifting identifications 
provides a critical space within which the straight-identified spectator may experience a 
complex and transformative shift in subjectivity.  
For the straight-identified spectator who watches The L Word, she is implicated in 
multiple ways. Perhaps, then, it is merely a condition of possibility that one steps outside 
of normative heterosexuality when viewing The L Word. After all, does it not take a 
certain “type” of heterosexual spectator to watch a show like The L Word at the outset? 
Perhaps one who understands (either conscious or unconsciously) that she is tuning in to 
watch a show about lesbian women and lesbian desire? It is this decentering of 
normativity that is the generative power of this specific spectatorial position: it is 
something else; it is excessive and other. In a word, it is eccentric. 
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Eccentricity and the Specificity of Spectatorial Positioning 
An eccentric spectatorial position may (or may not) necessarily be one that is readily 
available to the spectator during her first screening of the L Word. That is not to say that 
the spectator must be a repeated viewer in order to acquire this eccentric mode of 
viewing. Certainly, the narrative cohesiveness the spectator will possess after she has 
completed the entire series may offer her a different perspective from which to re-watch 
The L Word. However, it is with each successive viewing that the specific modes of 
address may “speak” to the spectator in a different way, offering her the possibility to 
“see” something else – something that was not within her line of vision before. More 
specifically, each successive viewing of The L Word engages the spectator’s subjectivity 
differently, contributing to an “internal” shift in consciousness that transforms her 
memory of and past viewing experiences with The L Word (White 197). This psychic 
transformation alters the ways in which the spectator now experiences (consciously and 
unconsciously) the social, cultural, and subjective positions (i.e., gender, race, class, 
sexuality) from which she both identifies with and interprets the events on screen (White 
197). Thus, the spectator is offered a different line of vision from which to view The L 
Word (or any other program). This experience of difference continually transforms the 
spectator’s subjectivity (consciously and unconsciously), constituting a new subject 
position from which to view The L Word. As a result, the specificity of one’s spectatorial 
position is always changing. 
While an eccentric spectatorial position accounts for the possibility that spectators 
experience same-sex desire, it acknowledges that this desire may not necessarily be 
experienced in the same way (if at all) between (and even within) spectators. The extent 
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to which spectators engage in processes of eccentric identifications is not completely 
independent; the spectator cannot simply “choose” how The L Word addresses them as a 
spectatorial subject, or how they respond to that particular mode of address. As 
mentioned previously, the viewing process is not a neutral one; each individual spectator 
brings her own social, cultural, and subjective (conscious and unconscious) experiences 
with which to interpret the events on screen. As such, the complex nexus of effects 
between imaging, narrativity, and camera work engages spectators differently, offering 
each individual viewer specific possibilities for identification and desire. This eccentric 
viewing position, then, is only one mode by which spectators can view The L Word. 
Because this theory of eccentric spectatorship is predicated on the recognition of 
difference between (and within) spectators, it must be noted that the preceding analysis of 
The L Word is my own – it is an interpretation that has been made possible by the ways in 
which television, as a social technology and a signifying practice, addresses me as a 
social subject. It is the complex interaction between my own “internal” fantasmic 
configuration and my location in social relations of gender, race, class, sexuality, etc. that 
allows the filmic conventions in The L Word to “speak” to me in a specific way, engaging 
my subjectivity and providing me with specific possibilities for identification and desire. 
My research and disciplinary formations as an academic researcher have certainly 
influenced my viewing of The L Word. For the purpose of this thesis, I have been 
privileged with the opportunity to not only re-watch The L Word from a critical position, 
but also reflect on my initial viewing experiences as a fan. This retroactive reflection has 
changed my relationship to my initial screening of The L Word; certain elements are 
consciously perceived only in retrospect, transforming my relationship to the viewing 
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process (White 197). It is impossible, then, for me to distance myself completely as an 
academic researcher from my eccentric interpretation of the series. Although I cannot 
quantify the extent to which my disciplinary formations and social, cultural, and 
subjective experiences (conscious and unconscious) have influenced my analysis, I can 
only acknowledge that it has. 
Although this analysis may not necessarily be one that all women experience, the 
specificity of my own eccentric spectatorial positioning points to the existence of another 
means by which spectators can view The L Word – one that is not solely determined by 
the institution of heterosexuality, but is rather, at the same time, both inside and outside 
of it. That is not to say that my eccentric viewing of The L Word is qualitatively “better” 
than one that exists within the normative structure of identification and desire. This 
eccentric interpretation claims to be neither “objective” nor the only position from which 
all spectators ought to view The L Word. As mentioned previously, there are specific 
pleasures and privileges afforded to the spectator who is not only addressed as a coherent 
social subject, but also able to see their “self” represented. Rather, the specificity of my 
own spectatorial position acknowledges the possibility that other spectators may also 
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Extending Eccentricity Beyond the Immediate Viewing Process 
 
I have attempted to articulate a theory of eccentric potentiality in order to explore 
how the specificity of one’s own spectatorial position offers each individual spectator 
positionalities of identification and desire; the filmic conventions (i.e., imaging, 
narrativity camera work) used in The L Word engage each individual spectator 
subjectively based on the social, historical, and subjective (conscious and unconscious) 
positions within which she is situated. As I have argued, this acquisition of an eccentric 
spectatorial position is a process of subjectification; a spectator’s subjectivity is 
transformed both consciously and unconsciously during the viewing process, forever 
altering the ways in which she makes sense of her “self.”  
While I have discussed how this processual subjective transformation occurs 
within the spectator at the level of the psychic imaginary, it is important to extend this 
concept of eccentric spectatorial positioning and excessive subjectivity beyond the 
immediate viewing process. How, exactly, does this eccentric sense of “self” affect the 
ways in which spectators interact with the social and material world around them? What 
are the ways in which spectators articulate their eccentric identifications and desires to 
others, and how does the public articulation of one’s own eccentric spectatorial position 
further transform a spectator’s subjective formation? Is it possible for this public 
articulation to undermine heteronormativity in mass culture? In this section, I will discuss 
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Experiencing Eccentricity: Case Study Shane McCutcheon 
Spectatorial identifications and desires are not experienced at the level of the psychic 
imaginary exclusively; they also occur at the level of cultural activity (Stacey 171). 
According to Jonathan Gray, spectators negotiate and make sense of their “selves” by 
performing them to others (58). While this experience of eccentricity is not necessarily 
one that is consciously apprehended by all spectators in the present, that is not to say that 
spectators are incapable of experiencing this contradiction; the spectator may either feel 
the effects of her sense of “self” as one that no longer aligns with the ways in which she 
is addressed as a normative heterosexual subject, or recognize that her position is 
eccentric in retrospect. 
The discomfort and anxiety produced by this contradictory experience of 
excessive subjectivity is neither constraining nor negative. As Sara Ahmed argues, 
discomfort is “not about assimilation or resistance, but about inhabiting norms 
differently. The inhabitance is generative or productive insofar as it does not end with the 
failure of norms to be secured, but with possibilities of living that do not ‘follow’ those 
norms through” (Cultural Politics of Emotion 155). In order to explore how the 
articulation of one’s eccentric spectatorial position encourages spectators to inhabit 
norms differently, this section will focus on the multiple ways in which viewers respond 
to the experience of eccentric spectatorship when watching The L Word. To accomplish 
this task, the following discussion will include a case study of the figure of Shane (played 
by Katherine Moennig) both in the show and off-screen in order to theorize how 
spectators receive and interpret this character: specifically, straight-identified viewers. 
*** 
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The character of Shane is introduced in season one of The L Word as a 
womanizing lesbian. What makes Shane distinct from the other lesbian characters on the 
show is her androgynous appeal, which serves a typified role in relation to televisual 
lesbian representability; there are specific codes of dress and behaviour in gay 
subcultures that are intelligible in popular culture (White 145). More specifically, it is 
Shane’s masculine qualities that render her lesbianism intelligible to spectators. As de 
Lauretis argues, “signs of masculinity are the most visually explicit and strongly coded 
by dominant discourses to signify sexual desire toward women, and hence their greater 
visibility in cultural representations of lesbianism, which correlates to their greater 
effectivity” (Practice of Love 264). For de Lauretis, then, spectators retroactively 
construct Shane as a figure of lesbian representability; “the [spectator] makes use of the 
very categories, male/female and masculinity/femininity, by which sexuality is socially 
constructed and subjectively apprehended” (Practice of Love 264). In other words, the 
figure of Shane becomes a lesbian fetish “object” representative of same-sex desire 
through a kind of “reverse discourse” – a discourse that is predicated on the conflation of 
gender and sexuality (de Lauretis, Practice of Love 264). 
This reverse discourse constitutes Shane as the figure of lesbian representability 
on The L Word; the signs of masculinity associated with her character are presumed to be 
direct indications of Shane’s sexual desire toward women. This signification of desire 
through the signs of masculinity not only increases the very visibility of these signs, but 
also contributes to the efficacy of this reverse discourse. In other words, the figure of 
Shane as a figure of lesbian representability accretes affective value through her 
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circulation and production as a significant, lesbian fetish object4 (Ahmed, “Affective 
Economies” 120). Thus, Shane, as a figure of lesbian representability, appears to possess 
intrinsic meaning; the conditions of lesbian representability appear to reside in Shane 
herself through the erasure of the social historical circumstances that have led her to 
become this object of same-sex desire for both queer and straight-identified women. As a 
result, Shane is constituted as a significant object that articulates spectators’ experiences 
of same-sex desire precisely because others have publicly witnessed a collective shared 
orientation toward this object. 
What is particularly significant about Shane is the extent to which this character 
has become a popular figure amongst heterosexual spectators. While Shane at first 
appears to be a highly sedimented figure of lesbian representability, the narrative and 
representational complexities her character experiences constructs Shane as a 
contradictory figure – a figure that embodies a (potentially) disruptive “force”; that is, the 
decentering of normativity (Ghosh 22). In fact, it is through the process of becoming this 
lesbian fetish object that Shane is transformed into a figure through which the straight-
identified spectator’s eccentric identifications and desires can be articulated. 
Narratively, Shane’s womanizing corroborates with the very “reverse discourse” 
that constitutes her as a lesbian fetish object; her promiscuity is conflated with the signs 
of masculinity, which further signifies her sexual desire toward women. As an avid 
practitioner of polyamory, Shane is narratively constructed as a predatory character; other 
women fall “victim” to her boyish charms, knowing full well that Shane will “love-‘em-
and-leave-‘em.” As the series develops, however, Shane’s character development 
                                                
4 Here, the designation of Shane as an “object” does not hold any negative or derogatory 
connotations associated with “objectification.” 
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complicates her “predatory” ways. Shane’s supposed inability to commit is revealed to be 
a product of her emotional vulnerability; she is withdrawn precisely because she is afraid 
of being hurt (even though Shane seemingly falls for “unavailable” women). 
Despite Shane’s narrative introduction as a “predatory” lesbian, the camera work 
used in the show further complicates this characterization, positioning Shane’s sexuality 
as one that is desirable. Like many of the other same-sex sex scenes on The L Word, 
Shane’s sex scenes are filmed using similar cinematic techniques, such as the use of 
medium close-up and close-up shots filmed by a handheld camera. While Shane is often 
depicted as the “instigator” of these sexual advances, the “look” of the camera remains 
unsutured to either one of the characters in these scenes; the spectator’s gaze is thus the 
“look” of the camera as we are placed in close proximity to Shane’s sexual escapades. 
This viewing position is neither removed nor voyeuristic. Shane may be a predator, but 
she cannot escape the spectator’s “look” (which is, in fact, the “look” of the camera) even 
in these intimate moments. 
The spectator’s position as an all-perceiving subject invites the viewer to take part 
in this intimate moment with Shane. By the time the straight-identified spectator sees 
Shane have sex with another woman for the first time, the viewer has already been 
inculcated into the “L World.” Readily accessing this “queer sensibility,” to use Moore’s 
term, the straight-identified spectator is able to experience same-sex desire through 
multiple points of identification, whether that is with the camera or with one of the 
figures of screen (“Having It All Ways” 20). 
The work of Shane’s sex scenes confirms that which the spectator already knows: 
Shane’s desire for women. As a result, Shane is further sedimented as a lesbian fetish 
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object, both visually (i.e., dress, behaviour, camera work) and narratively; and it is 
precisely because Shane signifies desire for other women that she is constituted as an 
object of same-sex desire for the spectator – an object through which straight-identified 
spectators may articulate this eccentric experience. 
 
Eccentric Spectatorship: The De-centering of Normativity 
The straight-identified spectator’s desire for Shane extends beyond the visual 
consumption of this figure; the public articulation of one’s eccentric subjective 
configuration is rendered intelligible through a multitude of cultural practices. There are 
numerous fans sites and message boards dedicated to the public adoration of the figure of 
Shane. While both queer and heterosexual spectators profess their “love” for the 
character on these sites by commenting on Shane’s “hotness” or sex appeal, there are 
moments when straight-identified spectators articulate an eccentric experience of same-
sex desire. In these specific posts, the straight-identified spectator expresses a desire to 
have Shane “ravish” her, or, if given the opportunity, the spectator would kiss and make 
love to Shane herself. The straight-identified spectator’s articulation of wanting Shane 
bears a contradiction that is neither addressed nor reconciled publicly in these online 
spaces; that is, this declaration of same-sex desire for Shane contradicts the “straight” 
spectator’s avowed sexual identity. 
While some straight-identified spectators want Shane, others articulate a desire to 
be her. On these websites, Shane is identified with particular “masculine” cultural 
commodities (i.e., men’s dress shirts, ties, motorcycle boots) that reproduce her 
fashionably androgynous identity – an identity that signifies lesbian representability 
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(Stacey 169). As it is suggested by these “Wanna Look Like Shane?” websites, the 
spectator is able to transform her appearance into one that resembles Shane through the 
work of purchasing and wearing these “masculine” cultural objects. In this moment, the 
spectator’s fantasy – that is, to look like Shane – becomes a concrete practice, one that is 
articulated through the material body by processes of copying (Stacey 167). As Jackie 
Stacey argues, copying is “a practice which transforms the spectators’ physical 
appearance… This process involves an intersection of self and other, subject and 
object… the spectator attempts to close the gap between her own image and her ideal 
image, by trying to produce a new image, more like her ideal” (167). In other words, 
copying is the desire to look like a particular star or iconic figure through the spectator’s 
attempted replication of appearance (Stacey 167). 
These cultural objects associated with Shane do not bear any intrinsic meaning in 
and of themselves. Rather, the “masculine” articles of clothing accrete affective value 
through their circulation and production as significant objects – which is to say, objects 
of lesbian representability that publicly articulate one’s desire to be Shane (Ahmed, 
“Affective Economies” 120). Thus, it is precisely because others have witnessed a 
collective shared orientation toward these objects that meaning and affective significance 
appear to reside in both the object and the figure of Shane; these associations begin to 
“stick” (Ahmed, Cultural Politics of Emotion 90). 
Although this practice of commodity consumption is located within the current 
capitalist structure, the articulation of one’s desires for Shane cannot be reduced to a 
commodity identity (White 34). Rather, there are moments at which the use and 
consumption of cultural objects produces something excessive to the current 
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heteronormative structure of identification and desire (Stacey 223). The spectator’s desire 
to look and be like Shane is a desire that is articulated through identifying with Shane. 
Although the spectator may be “straight,” she desires to look and be like Shane by 
attaining her wardrobe – a wardrobe that, through its “masculine” qualities, signifies 
lesbian representability. In this specific moment, there is a separation of gender from 
sexuality. Shane – as the figure of lesbian representability – becomes an identity rather 
than an orientation. In other words, the spectator who buys Shane’s “look” does not 
necessarily buy her sexual object choices; it is a citation of gender, rather that sexuality. 
This desire to look and be like Shane also bears an unaddressed contradiction: that 
is, wanting to look and be like Shane may articulate a desire of wanting to be wanted as 
Shane is, which is very different from simply wanting to be “ravaged” by Shane. Thus, 
this specific desire to look and be like Shane – who is a lesbian fetish object – contradicts 
the straight-identified spectator’s avowed heterosexual identity; and it is precisely 
because this internal contradiction is unaddressed that constitutes it as an eccentric 
moment of possibility. 
*** 
Both the unqualified adoration of Shane and practices of copying are performative 
articulations that are rendered intelligible through current discursive formations. 
According to Ahmed (paraphrasing Butler) “a performative utterance can only ‘succeed’ 
if it repeats a coded or iterable utterance: it works precisely by citing norms and 
conventions that already exist” (Cultural Politics of Emotion 93). Through these specific 
performatives, then, the spectator attempts to render intelligible an unintelligible, 
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eccentric moment – a moment that was felt during her viewing of The L Word; that is, her 
experience of same-sex desire. 
These performatives are declarations that involve something more than the 
individual spectator; they are relational, involving an act of shared witnessing. More 
specifically, this public articulation is spoken to others at the same time it is rendered 
intelligible to the very spectator uttering the performative (Ahmed, Cultural Politics of 
Emotion 94). This shared witnessing invites others to engage with the performative, 
encouraging them to address whether they do or do not want Shane, or even want to be 
her. Thus, these performatives generate a collection of individuals who are bound 
together by their shared orientation; the individual spectators come into this collectivity 
by articulating that they, too, either want Shane or want to be her (Ahmed, Cultural 
Politics of Emotion 94). 
It is through the relationality of this shared witnessing that the spectator’s own 
feelings and personal investments are intensified (Ahmed, Cultural Politics of Emotion 
130). The spectator’s public articulation not only aligns her with others who share this 
same orientation, but also provides the spectator with the opportunity to recognize that 
she is not the only one who has articulated this experience of same-sex desire. This 
shared witnessing constitutes the figure of Shane as an object that is both meaningful and 
affectively significant to the spectator and others who share this orientation; the figure of 
Shane begins to publicly “circulate” as a significant object that articulates one’s eccentric 
experiences of same-sex desire (Ahmed, “Affective Economies” 119). 
While the individual spectator’s performative articulations of same-sex desire 
bind her with others who share this orientation, not all spectators necessarily share the 
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same relationship to this public declaration; each individual spectator experiences this 
performative in different ways (Gorton 61). Although it is possible for spectators to share 
subjective experiences, this is not to say that a shared experience and interpretation is 
either a generalizable or an intrinsic property of The L Word, the figure of Shane, or the 
object itself (de Lauretis, Practice of Love 130). The extent to which spectators make 
sense of and articulate their identifications and desires to others through this public 
articulation is influenced by the specificity of each individual spectator’s spectatorial 
positioning (Stacey 217). As de Lauretis argues: 
[W]hen it comes to engaging the spectator’s fantasy and identification, a 
film’s effects are neither structural (if structural is equated with universal) 
nor totally structured by the film (by its fantasy, narration or form); rather, 
they are contingent on the spectator’s subjectivity and subjecthood (which 
are themselves, to some extent, already structured but also open to 
restructuration). (Practice of Love 130) 
In other words, although practices of copying and unqualified adoration for Shane 
are public and collective articulations of one’s eccentric identifications and desires, not 
all spectators will experience this articulation in the same way. While spectators may 
have viewed the same program, each individual spectator is subjectivity constituted in a 
multitude of ways; the specificities of one’s social, cultural, and subjective (conscious 
and unconscious) experiences influence the ways in which each spectator makes sense of 
and negotiates her public articulation of her desire for Shane (de Lauretis, Figures of 
Resistance 142). 
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Since these performatives require the citation of existing norms and conventions 
to render intelligible an unsymbolizable eccentric moment, it is not always possible to 
encapsulate the specificities of one’s identifications and desires through the spectator’s 
collective orientation toward the figure of Shane. However, that is not to say that this 
subjective experience is not eccentric. This performative citation ultimately fails to 
capture the felt contradiction between the “straight” spectator’s avowed sexual identity 
and her desire for Shane (whether that is her desire to want Shane or want to be her). 
It is precisely because this contradiction is not reconciled by the performative that 
it remains excessive to its very citation. Although the spectator’s experience of same-sex 
desire may be eccentric to the categories of heterosexuality and homosexuality, she is not 
completely outside of the discursive formations that render her public articulation 
intelligible to others; the performative works within the current normative structure in 
order to exceed it. In this eccentric moment, then, the impossible is happening: the 
spectator is positioned as excessive to the ideology of heterosexuality. Thus, through 
public practices of adoration and copying, eccentric spectatorship becomes something 
else: it is a decentering of normative heterosexuality through the articulation of a 
collective identity. 
This public articulation of one’s eccentric subjective configuration is experienced 
as a transformative shift in subjectivity. Through the act of declaring one’s adoration for 
Shane (whether it is commenting on her supposed “hotness,” expressing a desire to kiss 
and make love to her, or copying her wardrobe), the referent (in this case, the individual 
spectator as the “I”) is transformed upon the delivery of this performative (Reddy 331). 
In other words, the public articulation of one’s identifications with and desires for the 
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figure of Shane may either intensify or diffuse the spectator’s internal subjective 
configuration; this performative is both influenced by and changes what it refers to after 
it has been immediately delivered. As a result, this public articulation of one’s eccentric 
identifications and desires for Shane alters the spectator’s subjective experiences of 
desire itself; it is through the spectator’s public articulation of same-sex desire that her 
initial internal subjective configuration is transformed into one that is eccentric. 
While the spectator does not necessarily experience this subjective transformation 
consciously in the present, the effects of this change are either felt immediately or made 
conscious to the spectator only in retrospect. Thus, the performative serves to publicly 
rework each individual spectator’s internal subjective configuration. This public 
articulation aligns the individual spectator with others who share this same orientation; it 
is through this alignment process whereby the spectator makes sense of her own 
subjective experiences in relation to the collective articulation, subsequently altering the 
spectator’s own internal subjective configuration. As a result, the articulation of one’s 
eccentric identifications and desires through practices of public adoration or coping have 
material and psychic effects; this performative works concretely to transform the ways in 
which the spectator makes sense of and articulates her excessive subjectivity to others. 
 It is in this moment where the unsymoblizable becomes symbolizable that this 
articulation is no longer eccentric; it becomes performative, grounded by an identifiable 
thing. In other words, the channels for expressing eccentricity opens a position in public 
culture that was previously unacknowledged. Thus, eccentricity is transformed into 
something else: it becomes a position that one can take up in culture, render visible, and 
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even comfortably occupy. The eccentric moment is “lost,” until the next eccentric 
experience. 
 
 “I’d Go Gay for Shane”: The Tempering of Eccentricity and a Collective Identity Re-
centered 
Although Shane’s mass popularity has given rise to a plethora of fan merchandise 
associated with the character and The L Word at large, straight-identified spectators 
maintain a tenuous relationship with this character; one need only comb through the 
various online discussion forums and message boards for fans of The L Word to see how 
spectators often preface their public adoration for Shane with the following statement: 
“I’m not gay, but…” According to Ahmed “the ‘orientation’ of the pleasure economy is 
bound up with heterosexuality” (Cultural Politics of Emotion 163). For Ahmed, the 
current structure of identification and desire is bound to sexual difference whereby 
“pleasure is ‘good’ only if it is oriented towards some objects, not others” (Cultural 
Politics of Emotion 163). The “I’d Go Gay for Shane” t-shirt references this supposed 
need for spectators to publicly qualify their adoration and attachment to this character.  
If we consider the t-shirt’s material conditions of production, the fact that this 
cultural object was not affiliated with the official Showtime network emphasizes the 
desire for straight-identified spectators to articulate this position of compromise: which is 
to say, a position for straight-identified spectators to express their experiences of same-
sex desire, albeit through commodity structures. While the phrase “I’d Go Gay for 
Shane” is not necessarily a direct articulation of one’s erotic object choice, there is an 
element of homoeroticism to this declaration – a homoeroticism that serves a potential 
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means through which spectators can make sense of and publicly articulate their desire for 
Shane to themselves and others (Stacey 172-173). 
Like practices of copying and other public displays of adoration, this declaration 
“I’d Go Gay for Shane” functions as a relational performative utterance that is rendered 
intelligible through current discursive formations. In other words, it is through this public 
articulation that the spectator not only attempts to render intelligible an unsymbolizable 
moment (that is, her eccentric experience of same-sex desire), but also aligns herself with 
a collectivity that shares this specific orientation. However, unlike the previous cultural 
practices discussed above, this specific declaration “I’d Go Gay for Shane” serves to 
temper one’s eccentric experience of same-sex desire through fetishism and disavowal; it 
is an attempt on behalf of the spectator to account for her experience of same-sex desire 
within normative heterosexuality.  
The ambiguity of this slogan “I’d Go Gay for Shane” offers spectators the 
opportunity to articulate their fetishistic identifications and desires to others through their 
consumption and wearing of this cultural commodity. Here, the word “I’d” is a 
contraction for the two words “I would,” altering the phrase from “I’d Go Gay for Shane” 
to “I Would Go Gay for Shane.” Here the words “I Would Go” construct this utterance as 
a futural one, suggesting that the spectator is not gay in the present moment. However, 
since the spectator would consider “going gay” for Shane, it can be assumed, then, that 
the spectator is heterosexual (or at least self-identifies as a heterosexual). 
This public articulation that one would “go gay” for Shane alludes to the 
spectator’s own contradictory internal subjective configuration. Although the declaration 
“I’d Go Gay for Shane” makes reference to the spectator’s desire for the figure of Shane, 
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the spectator recognizes (either conscious or unconsciously) that this articulation of 
same-sex desire does not align with the way in which she is addressed as a normative 
heterosexual subject. As a result, the spectator’s public articulation that she would “go 
gay” for Shane is an attempt to not only navigate this experience of a contradictory sense 
of self, but also inoculate against identifying as a lesbian or bisexual woman. In effect, it 
is the very fixity of the categories “heterosexuality” and “homosexuality” that offer the 
spectator the very possibility of “going gay” for Shane; this spectator cannot be 
heterosexual (or at least a normative heterosexual subject) because she experiences same-
sex desire for Shane. Thus, the spectator must “go gay.” 
However, the very idea that the spectator could simply “go gay” in order to 
accommodate her experiences of same-sex desire undoes the supposed impermeability of 
these categories. On the one hand, the spectator’s experience of same-sex desire does not 
necessarily transform her into a homosexual; although the spectator would consider 
“going gay” for Shane, she recognizes (either consciously or unconsciously) that the term 
“homosexual” does not align with her sense of “self,” otherwise the declaration would be 
something closer to “I Am Gay for Shane” or “I have Gone Gay for Shane (or “I’m Gay 
for Shane” and “I’ve Gone Gay for Shane” if we are keeping with the stylistic and 
informal nature of the original slogan by using the contraction “I’m” for “I am”), rather 
than “I’d Go Gay for Shane.” On the other hand, the spectator’s experiences of same-sex 
desire do not align with her sense of “self” as a normative heterosexual subject, hence her 
consideration to “go gay” and become something other than heterosexual in order to 
accommodate this experience of same-sex desire. This articulation to “go gay” is an 
expression of the very kinds of sexuality “tourism” Moore describes. Although the 
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heterosexual spectator may experience same-sex desire through touristically “going gay,” 
she can always return “home” to the comfort and coherence of normative heterosexuality; 
this experience of same-sex desire has no bearing on the spectator’s subjectivity. 
The use of the word “go” in this declaration is of particular importance as it is 
deployed as a futural utterance. Here, the word “go” suggests that the transformative 
process by which the spectator “goes gay” for Shane is one that is processual and 
incomplete; there is neither a clear distinction that this transformative process of “going 
gay” has even begun, nor a temporal indication of when this “transformation” will be 
complete. As a result, Shane is constructed as a fetishistic, “compromise” object; 
although the spectator may “go gay” for Shane, this declaration need not necessarily 
mean that she would “go gay” for all women. 
The phrase “I’d Go Gay for Shane” secures identity and expresses desire; the 
future tense emphasizes the heterosexual spectator’s “straight” identity as it 
simultaneously expresses the spectator’s desire for Shane, if only at the level of fantasy. 
In other words, the performative utterance “I’d Go Gay for Shane” serves to secure the 
heterosexual positioning of the spectator and her own voyeurism with respect to The L 
Word. As such, the ambiguity of this declaration provides the spectator with the 
opportunity to reconcile her contradictory sense of self by continuing to self-identify as 
heterosexual; although the spectator would “go gay” for Shane, she is able to maintain 
that she in fact not gay. 
While “I’d Go Gay for Shane” functions like all performatives in that it requires 
the citation of existing norms and conventions to render one’s experience of same-sex 
desire intelligible, it is precisely because this utterance explicitly disavows one’s 
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experience of same-sex desire that makes it impossible for the spectator to articulate the 
specificities of her eccentric identifications and desires. In other words, this performative 
utterance binds, unifies, and creates a subject position that is inscribed in ideology; even 
though “going gay” may mean something different between, and even within, spectators, 
the eccentric potentiality of the straight-identified spectator’s experience of same-sex 
desire has been tempered by the collective identity “I’d Go Gay for Shane.” Through this 
shared public declaration of fetishism and disavowal, then, eccentric spectatorship 
becomes something else: a collective identity re-centered. 
“I’d Go Gay for Shane” is about not only expressing desire (if only at the level of 
fantasy), but also disidentifying from the character herself. This process of fetishism and 
disavowal not only sustains the spectator’s contradictory identifications and desires, but 
also prevents the spectator from feeling the transformative effects of this internal 
contradiction (de Lauretis, Figures of Resistance 139). This t-shirt, then, provides the 
straight-identified spectator with the possibility to maintain her avowed sexual identity 
while publicly articulating her experience of same-sex desire. In fact, the spectator’s 
experience of same-sex desire is one that is longer seen as “inappropriate” given the 
collective public orientation toward this object; there are others who are not gay, but 
would also consider “going gay” for Shane. Consequently, this performative utterance 
functions as a re-affirmation of the very normative categories of heterosexuality and 
homosexuality that confine the spectator’s experiences of same-sex desire, while 
simultaneously revealing these categories to be as equally unstable as identity itself. In 
other words, “I’d Go Gay for Shane” confirms the specific ideologies of gender that 
enable one to fantasize same-sex desire while keeping these very categories intact. 
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The Materiality of Eccentric Identifications and Desires 
The preceding analysis has attempted to explore the ways in which spectators can 
articulate their eccentric identifications and desires beyond the immediate viewing 
process. Whereas the articulation of wanting Shane expresses an eccentric desire (if only 
at the level of fantasy), wanting to be like Shane differs in that it is an eccentric desire 
articulated through identifying with this figure. Despite these material articulations of 
eccentricity, there are also performative utterances that serve to temper the straight-
identified spectator’s contradictory experiences of identification and same-sex desire. 
Unlike the other two performative utterances, “I’d Go Gay for Shane” is an explicit 
disidentification with the character of Shane; it is an articulation of desire through 
fetishism, which enables the straight-identified spectator to account for her experience of 
same-sex desire within normative heterosexuality. At the same time, Shane’s female 
masculinity, framed through a “reverse discourse” whereby female masculinity signifies 
lesbian representability, constitutes Shane’s masculine traits as desirable. In other words, 
Shane’s female masculinity is paradoxical; she embodies a masculine role that is 
intelligible within the confines of heteronormativity. However, these same masculine 
qualities are precisely the signs that signify lesbian representability. This “reverse 
discourse” allows the straight-identified spectator to desire to feel wanted by Shane, 
making Shane’s female masculinity the object of desire: Shane’s sex (female) and 
sexuality (lesbian) are understood as secondary to her gender performance (masculinity). 
Thus, spectators’ public articulations of wanting Shane, wanting to be Shane (whether 
that is wanting to look like Shane or wanting to be desired as this character is), and 
“going gay” for Shane contributes to the further entrenchment of this “reverse discourse”; 
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each performative emphasizes the very signs of masculinity that signify lesbian 
representability, further sedimenting this problematic conflation between sexuality and 
gender. 
Although I have focused on cultural practices that occur external to the viewing 
process, it must be noted that there are different levels of spectatorial engagement that do 
not necessarily involve one’s participation in a collective fan community (Gorton 41). 
What this analysis has attempted to show, then, is how a spectator’s eccentric 
identifications and desires are not only experienced at the individual and psychic level of 
the unconscious, but also map onto the real world beyond the fictional “L World” 
depicted onscreen; spectatorial identifications and desires are material and embodied 
experiences, as well as psychic processes (de Lauretis, Practice of Love 285-286).  
While the spectator’s performative articulations of eccentricity are experienced as 
a shift in subjectivity, the spectator may not necessarily be conscious of this 
transformation during its inception. Rather, the spectator may either feel the effects of 
this subjective transformation or come to retroactively recognize the eccentricity of her 
experience. This subjective shift subsequently transforms the spectator’s memories and 
past viewing experiences, forever altering the ways in which the individual spectator will 
view The L Word (or any other program, for that matter) in the future. The filmic 
conventions used in The L Word will now engage the spectator subjectively on different 
terms, transforming the very conditions of possibility for identification and desire by 
offering each individual spectator a new line of vision from which to “see” something 
else. 
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Theorizing Eccentricity 
 
At the beginning stages of this project, I was required to present an excerpt of my 
thesis to the first-year Master’s students in my program. The night before the 
presentation, I sat at the dinner table with my partner discussing my theoretical 
framework of eccentricity, to which he responded (jokingly, of course): “So you’re 
basically coming up with a theory that explains how everyone is bisexual?” 
An interesting provocation. 
 The following morning, I delivered my presentation at the research symposium. 
During the question period, one student responded to my discussion of eccentricity by 
articulating his appreciation for theories of sexuality that acknowledged the fluidity of 
desire. For this student, eccentricity seemed to encapsulate sexuality as more of a 
continuum – one that was always in a state of “flux.” 
Another interesting provocation. 
While I made it through the question period relatively unscathed, I was 
approached by another student during the lunch break with yet, another interesting 
provocation. She asked: “I like the term eccentricity, but why did you choose that 
particular term and not something, like, ‘queer’? It seems like you’re discussing 
something very similar. You’re just going about it in a different way.”  
*** 
Is eccentricity just another term for queer, bisexuality, and/or other forms (sexual 
and non-sexual) of woman-identification? What does this theory of eccentric spectatorial 
positioning and excessive subjectivity offer that is different from other theories of 
sexuality? These provocations are the ones that have been guiding my research from the 
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outset. In this final section, I will discuss what, exactly, a theory of eccentric 
spectatorship has the offer to the study of sexuality, locating eccentricity as something 
other than “queer,” “bisexual,” or simply another “point” on the “lesbian continuum” 
(Rich 648). 
 
Locating Eccentricity as Something Else 
While eccentricity acknowledges the possibility for heterosexual spectators to experience 
same-sex desire, this concept may appear to be closer to “queer” insofar as it reveals the 
very norms and conventions that make this experience of same-sex desire “queer” or 
“eccentric” at the outset. However, unlike queer – which risks being collapsed into 
gender identity – eccentricity is excessive; it works to disrupt (rather than maintain) 
continuity (or any notion of a lesbian continuum, for that matter) through its emphasis on 
contradiction. It is this preoccupation with excess that makes eccentricity different from 
other theories of sexuality; the unconscious is a point of resistance precisely because it is 
excessive to ideology (de Lauretis, Figures of Resistance 162). 
The reintroduction of questions of the unconscious into this thesis has provided 
me with the opportunity to map the space between film theories of spectatorship and the 
Cultural Studies approach to reception that characterizes contemporary televisual 
analyses of spectatorship. In an attempt to challenge the notion of the “passive” spectator 
from early apparatus film theory, current televisual analyses of spectatorship have 
overemphasized the supremacy of the spectator’s role as the sole producer of meaning; 
spectators can interpret and appropriate cultural texts for their own individual purposes 
(Stacey 38-39). This “populism” constructs spectatorship as a largely conscious process, 
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equating pleasure with a necessarily resistant notion of activity (Stacey 38-39; 40). 
Consequently, this populism fails to account for difference between (and even within) 
spectators. Instead, spectators are massified into an undifferentiated audience, which 
unintentionally presumes that all spectators are not only addressed, but also engaged by 
representations in the same way. 
The conflation of pleasure and activity in current televisual analyses of 
spectatorship is thus positioned in opposition to passivity as collusion, which is often 
associated with psychoanalytic theories of spectatorship (Stacey 40). More specifically, 
the use of psychoanalysis in studying the unconscious and psychic mechanisms at work 
in the spectator has been critiqued for maintaining differential power relations between 
the researcher and those who are being researched. As Jackie Stacey argues: 
To analyze [spectators’] response in terms of their unconscious psychic 
structures which the researcher, but not the researched, can identify is to 
impose the greatest degree of power difference between the two parties. 
The assumption behind such a method of interpretation is that audiences 
have offered information, but that the researcher can read between the 
lines for latent meanings which reveal unconscious responses that are 
more significant than those apparently offered by the respondents. (77) 
For Stacey, then, the use of psychoanalytic theory exacerbates the problems 
associated with the power afforded the researcher to interpret spectators’ responses. 
While I acknowledge Stacey’s assertion that I, as a researcher, am unable to account for 
all spectators’ reception of The L Word, this is not to say that it is impossible for this 
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theory of eccentric spectatorship to account for the specificities of spectatorial 
positioning.  
As I have argued elsewhere in this thesis, the ways in which spectators experience 
and engage with television programs is neither a self-evident, nor an easily observable 
phenomenon; spectatorship is a social and psychic process. As such, I have attempted to 
account for this epistemological challenge by retroactively situating my analysis of The L 
Word with my own subjective experiences. Although this methodological consideration 
may limit my ability to articulate the specificities of all spectators’ reception to The L 
Word, this theory of eccentric spectatorship can account for how the show may address 
spectators and the manner in which spectatorial positioning may exceed that very 
address. 
The unconscious, then, ought not to be conflated with either passivity or 
collusion. Processes of spectatorial identification and desire are “active” ones, relying on 
the engagement of a socially constituted subjectivity (de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t 149). 
This psychic process of engagement provides each individual spectator with specific 
positionalities of identifications and desire. While the spectator may not necessarily be 
conscious during this process of subjective engagement, she is able to feel the 
transformative effects of this shift in subjectivity: the ways in which the spectator makes 
sense of and interacts with her material and social reality has been forever altered. Thus, 
it is the spectator’s experience of this transformative shift that offers her the possibility to 
understand that her spectatorial position may be eccentric, albeit only in retrospect. 
 Although such retroactive reflection will never encapsulate what, exactly, one is 
feeling or thinking during the immediate viewing process, this is a challenge that all 
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spectatorship studies must consider; it is difficult, if not impossible, to account for 
everything the spectator may be thinking during her immediate viewing of a particular 
program. Thus, it is through the study of the unconscious that one is offered the 
possibility to begin challenging the privileged and rational status associated with 
conscious thought. 
To study the unconscious and psychic structures at work in the spectator is to 
acknowledge that we can no longer articulate with absolute certainty that “this” is what is 
happening in the present. Rather, to acknowledge that there are some things one cannot 
know or understand in the present is to provide oneself with the opportunity to think 
through the multiple possibilities of what could be happening in that immediate moment. 
Although this mode of theorizing forces us to forgo the ability to say with absolute 
certainty that “this” is what is happening, this contradiction is the paradox of studying the 
unconscious; one can only begin to know only after one recognizes that they are unable to 
know everything. 
While some would characterize this model of analysis as “speculative,” I prefer 
the term generative. The eccentric account of The L Word given in this thesis may not 
necessarily be one that all spectators share; however, this concept of eccentricity 
acknowledges the possibility for other eccentric interpretations of the same television 
program. Thus, this theory of eccentric spectatorship is a theory of possibility and 
potentiality. 
*** 
This project was initially conceived as a political economy analysis of how the 
production apparatus of the television industry structures lesbian representational content, 
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offering spectators different possibilities for identification. As I began to explore how, 
exactly, processes of identification were conceived in the literature, I discovered that this 
term lacked conceptual clarity. As a result, my thesis became less concerned with the 
macro structural analysis of the television industry that I had initially proposed, and 
shifted toward a theoretical discussion of the televisual spectatorial subject. 
The goal of this research has been to acknowledge spectatorship as a dynamic 
process. I have attempted to develop a theory of eccentric spectatorship in order to 
account for the process by which the specificity of one’s spectatorial positioning and 
experience of excessive subjectivity may exceed the ways in which the spectator is 
addressed as a heterosexual subject. More specifically, this eccentric viewing position not 
only accounts for spectators’ multiple interpretative possibilities, but also acknowledges 
differences between (and even within) spectators; the complex nexus of effects between 
imaging, narrativity, and camera work used in The L Word engage spectators subjectively 
based on the social, historical, and subjective (conscious and unconscious) positions 
within which they are situated. This process of spectatorial positioning offers each 
individual spectator specific possibilities for identification and desire, which may be 
excessive to the current heteronormative structure. Thus, the specificity of one’s 
spectatorial position may be located both inside and outside the ideology of 
heterosexuality; it is eccentric to the category of heterosexuality itself, providing 
spectators with the opportunity to experience same-sex desire and engage in processes of 
identification that may exceed the search for oneself on screen. 
This eccentric spectatorial position is experienced by the spectator as a 
transformative shift in subjectivity, forever altering the spectator’s memory and past 
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viewing experiences (White 197). Although the spectator may not necessarily be 
conscious of this subjective transformation during its inception, she may either feel the 
effects or this change or come to retroactively experience her spectatorial position as one 
that is eccentric. As a result, this subjective transformation not only offers the spectator a 
new line of vision from which to view The L Word (or any other program), but also 
changes the ways in which the spectator will experience the social and material world 
around her. 
Eccentric spectatorship, then, is not only experienced by the spectator as a psychic 
and internal shift in subjectivity, but also extends beyond the immediate viewing process; 
it is a social and material, as well as a psychic and individual process. As I have argued, 
spectators make sense of and articulate their eccentric identifications and desires to 
themselves and others through various cultural activities, which include the consumption 
of cultural commodities associated with The L Word. This public articulation of one’s 
eccentric spectatorial position is not only perceptible to others, but also requires the 
participation of other spectators; it is through the process of articulating one’s eccentric 
spectatorial position that the individual spectator is aligned with others who share this 
similar orientation.  
This public articulation of one’s eccentric spectatorial position has the potential to 
decenter normativity in mass culture; the straight-identified spectator may experience an 
internal contradiction between her avowed sexual identity and her experience of same-
sex desire, leading to a transformative shift in subjectivity. This shift transforms the 
spectator’s internal subjective configuration and her initial relationship to The L Word. 
  82 
Despite the disruptive potential of this public articulation, however, eccentricity 
can also be tempered through processes of fetishism and disavowal. In other words, the 
spectator may experience same-sex desire, but disavow any notion that this experience 
contradicts her “straight” sexual identity external to the viewing process. As a result, the 
spectator is able to hold two contradictory beliefs, maintaining the idea that she is still 
“heterosexual” despite her feelings of same-sex desire, even if it is only at the level of 
fantasy. 
An eccentric spectatorial position is not solely about the spectator’s ability to 
“subvert” or “resist” her interpellation into the ideology of heterosexuality. Rather, this 
eccentric subject position is excessive to this ideological address; it is at the same time 
inside and outside of the current heteronormative structure of identification and desire, 
and can never be completely outside of it. While I have developed this theory of eccentric 
potentiality in relation to The L Word, my hope is that this notion of excessive 
subjectivity may extend beyond the show itself. This theory of eccentricity acknowledges 
that there are other ways of thinking about and engaging with the social and material 
reality around us: it is an epistemological shift that makes possible the existence of a 
space that is at the same time inside and outside of the ideology of heterosexuality. As a 
result, eccentric spectatorship reveals the unrelenting norms and ideological formations 
that constitute the straight-identified spectator’s experience of same-sex desire as one that 
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